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App Stores: From Mobile Platforms To VMs – Ripe For Abuse

March 2nd, 2011 4 comments
Android Market

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This CNN article titled “Google pulls 21 apps in Android malware scare” describes an alarming trend in which malicious code is embedded in applications which are made available for download and use on mobile platforms:

Google has just pulled 21 popular free apps from the Android Market. According to the company, the apps are malware aimed at getting root access to the user’s device, gathering a wide range of available data, and downloading more code to it without the user’s knowledge.

Although Google has swiftly removed the apps after being notified (by the ever-vigilant “Android Police” bloggers), the apps in question have already been downloaded by at least 50,000 Android users.

The apps are particularly insidious because they look just like knockoff versions of already popular apps. For example, there’s an app called simply “Chess.” The user would download what he’d assume to be a chess game, only to be presented with a very different sort of app.

Wow, 50,000 downloads.  Most of those folks are likely blissfully unaware they are owned.

In my Cloudifornication presentation, I highlighted that the same potential for abuse exists for “virtual appliances” which can be uploaded for public consumption to app stores and VM repositories such as those from VMware and Amazon Web Services:

The feasibility for this vector was deftly demonstrated shortly afterward by the guys at SensePost (Clobbering the Cloud, Blackhat) who showed the experiment of uploading a non-malicious “phone home” VM to AWS which was promptly downloaded and launched…

This is going to be a big problem in the mobile space and potentially just as impacting in cloud/virtual datacenters as people routinely download and put into production virtual machines/virtual appliances, the provenance and integrity of which are questionable.  Who’s going to police these stores?

(update: I loved Christian Reilly’s comment on Twitter regarding this: “Using a public AMI is the equivalent of sharing a syringe”)

/Hoff

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CloudPassage & Why Guest-Based Footprints Matter Even More For Cloud Security

February 1st, 2011 4 comments
VM (operating system)

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Every day for the last week or so after their launch, I’ve been asked left and right about whether I’d spoken to CloudPassage and what my opinion was of their offering.  In full disclosure, I spoke with them when they were in stealth almost a year ago and offered some guidance as well as the day before their launch last week.

Disappointing as it may be to some, this post isn’t really about my opinion of CloudPassage directly; it is, however, the reaffirmation of the deployment & delivery models for the security solution that CloudPassage has employed.  I’ll let you connect the dots…

Specifically, in public IaaS clouds where homogeneity of packaging, standardization of images and uniformity of configuration enables scale, security has lagged.  This is mostly due to the fact that for a variety of reasons, security itself does not scale (well.)

In an environment where the underlying platform cannot be counted upon to provide “hooks” to integrate security capabilities in at the “network” level, all that’s left is what lies inside the VM packaging:

  1. Harden and protect the operating system [and thus the stuff atop it,]
  2. Write secure applications and
  3. Enforce strict, policy-driven information-centric security.

My last presentation, “Cloudinomicon: Idempotent Infrastructure, Building Survivable Systems and Bringing Sexy Back to Information Centricity” addressed these very points. [This one is a version I delivered at the University of Michigan Security Summit]

If we focus on the first item in that list, you’ll notice that generally to effect policy in the guest, you must have a footprint on said guest — however thin — to provide the hooks that are needed to either directly effect policy or redirect back to some engine that offloads this functionality.  There’s a bit of marketing fluff associated with using the word “agentless” in many applications of this methodology today, but at some point, the endpoint needs some sort of “agent” to play*

So that’s where we are today.  The abstraction offered by virtualized public IaaS cloud platforms is pushing us back to the guest-centric-based models of yesteryear.

This will bring challenges with scale, management, efficacy, policy convergence between physical and virtual and the overall API-driven telemetry driven by true cloud solutions.

You can read more about this in some of my other posts on the topic:

Finally, since I used them for eyeballs, please do take a look at CloudPassage — their first (free) offerings are based upon leveraging small footprint Linux agents and a cloud-based SaaS “grid” to provide vulnerability management, and firewall/zoning in public cloud environments.

/Hoff

* There are exceptions to this rule depending upon *what* you’re trying to do, such as anti-malware offload via a hypervisor API, but this is not generally available to date in public cloud.  This will, I hope, one day soon change.

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Revisiting Virtualization & Cloud Stack Security – Back to the Future (Baked In Or Bolted On?)

January 17th, 2011 No comments

[Like a good w[h]ine, this post goes especially well with a couple of other courses such as Hack The Stack Or Go On a Bender With a Vendor?, Incomplete Thought: Why Security Doesn’t Scale…Yet, What’s The Problem With Cloud Security? There’s Too Much Of It…, Incomplete Thought: The Other Side Of Cloud – Where The (Wild) Infrastructure Things Are… and Where Are the Network Virtual Appliances? Hobbled By the Virtual Network, That’s Where…]

There are generally three dichotomies of thought when it comes to the notion of how much security should fall to the provider of the virtualization or cloud stack versus that of the consumer of their services or a set of third parties:

  1. The virtualization/cloud stack provider should provide a rich tapestry of robust security capabilities “baked in” to the platform itself, or
  2. The virtualization/cloud stack provider should provide security-enabling hooks to enable an ecosystem of security vendors to provide the bulk of security (beyond isolation) to be “bolted on,” or
  3. The virtualization/cloud stack provider should maximize the security of the underlying virtualization/cloud platform and focus on API security, isolation and availability of service only while pushing the bulk of security up into the higher-level programatic/application layers, or

So where are we today?  How much security does the stack, itself, need to provide. The answer, however polarized, is somewhere in the murkiness dictated by the delivery models, deployment models, who owns what part of the real estate and the use cases of both the virtualization/cloud stack provider and ultimately the consumer.

I’ve had a really interesting series of debates with the likes of Simon Crosby (of Xen/Citrix fame) on this topic and we even had a great debate at RSA with Steve Herrod from VMware.  These two “infrastructure” companies and their solutions typify the diametrically opposed first two approaches to answering this question while cloud providers who own their respective custom-rolled “stacks” at either end of IaaS and SaaS spectrums such as Amazon Web Services and Salesforce bringing up the third.

As with anything, this is about the tenuous balance of “security,” compliance, cost, core competence and maturity of solutions coupled with the sensitivity of the information that requires protection and the risk associated with the lopsided imbalance that occurs in the event of loss.

There’s no single best answer which explains why were have three very different approaches to what many, unfortunately, view as the same problem.

Today’s “baked in” security capabilities aren’t that altogether mature or differentiated, the hooks and APIs that allow for diversity and “defense in depth” provide for new and interesting ways to instantiate security, but also add to complexity, driving us back to an integration play.  The third is looked upon as proprietary and limiting in terms of visibility and transparency and don’t solve problems such as application and information security any more than the other two do.

Will security get “better” as we move forward with virtualization and cloud computing.  Certainly.  Perhaps because of it, perhaps in spite of it.

One thing’s for sure, it’s going to be messy, despite what the marketing says.

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Incomplete Thought: Why Security Doesn’t Scale…Yet.

January 11th, 2011 1 comment
X-ray machines and metal detectors are used to...
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There are lots of reasons one might use to illustrate why operationalizing security — both from the human and technology perspectives — doesn’t scale.

I’ve painted numerous pictures highlighting the cyclical nature of technology transitions, the supply/demand curve related to threats, vulnerabilities, technology and compensating controls and even relevant anecdotes involving the intersection of Moore’s and Metcalfe’s laws.  This really was a central theme in my Cloudinomicon presentation; “idempotent infrastructure, building survivable systems and bringing sexy back to information centricity.”

Here are some other examples of things I’ve written about in this realm.

Batting around how public “commodity” cloud solutions forces us to re-evaluate how, where, why and who “does” security was an interesting journey.  Ultimately, it comes down to architecture and poking at the sanctity of models hinged on an operational premise that may or may not be as relevant as it used to be.

However, I think the most poignant and yet potentially obvious answer to the “why doesn’t security scale?” question is the fact that security products, by design, don’t scale because they have not been created to allow for automation across almost every aspect of their architecture.

Automation and the interfaces (read: APIs) by which security products ought to be provisioned, orchestrated, and deployed are simply lacking in most security products.

Yes, there exist security products that are distributed but they are still managed, provisioned and deployed manually — generally using a management hub-spoke model that doesn’t lend itself to automated “anything” that does not otherwise rely upon bubble-gum and bailing wire scripting…

Sure, we’ve had things like SNMP as a “standard interface” for “management” for a long while 😉  We’ve had common ways of describing threats and vulnerabilities.  Recently we’ve seen the emergence of XML-based APIs emerge as a function of the latest generation of (mostly virtualized) firewall technologies, but most products still rely upon stand-alone GUIs, CLIs, element managers and a meat cloud of operators to push the go button (or reconfigure.)

Really annoying.

Alongside the lack of standard API-based management planes, control planes are largely proprietary and the output for correlated event-driven telemetry at all layers of the stack is equally lacking.  Of course the applications and security layers that run atop infrastructure are still largely discrete thus making the problem more difficult.

The good news is that virtualization in the enterprise and the emergence of the cultural and operational models predicated upon automation are starting to influence product roadmaps in ways that will positively affect the problem space described above but we’ve got a long haul as we make this transition.

Security vendors are starting to realize that they must retool many of their technology roadmaps to deal with the impact of dynamism and automation.  Some, not all, are discovering painfully the fact that simply creating a virtualized version of a physical appliance doesn’t make it a virtual security solution (or cloud security solution) in the same way that moving an application directly to cloud doesn’t necessarily make it a “cloud application.”

In the same way that one must often re-write or specifically design applications “designed” for cloud, we have to do the same for security.  Arguably there are things that can and should be preserved; the examples of the basic underpinnings such as firewalls that at their core don’t need to change but their “packaging” does.

I’m privy to lots of the underlying mechanics of these activities — from open source to highly-proprietary — and I’m heartened by the fact that we’re beginning to make progress.  We shouldn’t have to make a distinction between crafting and deploying security policies in physical or virtual environments.  We shouldn’t be held hostage by the separation of application logic from the underlying platforms.

In the long term, I’m optimistic we won’t have to.

/Hoff

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From the Concrete To The Hypervisor: Compliance and IaaS/PaaS Cloud – A Shared Responsibility

December 6th, 2010 No comments

* Update:  A few hours after writing this last night, AWS announced they had achieved Level 1 PCI DSS Compliance.* If you pay attention to how the announcement is worded, you’ll find a reasonable treatment of what PCI compliance means to an IaaS cloud provider – it’s actually the first time I’ve seen this honestly described:

Merchants and other service providers can now run their applications on AWS PCI-compliant technology infrastructure to store, process and transmit credit card information in the cloud. Customers can use AWS cloud infrastructure, which has been validated at the highest level (Level 1) of PCI compliance, to build their cardholder environment and achieve PCI certification for their applications.

Note how they phrased this, then read my original post below.

However, pay no attention to the fact that they chose to make this announcement on Pearl Harbor Day 😉

Here’s the thing…

A cloud provider can achieve compliance (such as PCI — yes v2.0 even) such that the in-scope elements of that provider which are audited and assessed can ultimately contribute to the compliance of a customer operating atop that environment.  We’ve seen a number of providers assert compliance across many fronts, but they marketed their way into a yellow card by over-reaching…

It should be clear already, but for a service to be considered compliant, it clearly means that the customer’s in-scope elements running atop a cloud provider must also undergo and achieve compliance.

That means compliance is elementally additive the same way “security” is when someone else has direct operational control over elements in the stack you don’t.

In the case of an IaaS cloud provider who may achieve compliance from the “concrete to the hypervisor,” (let’s use PCI again,) the customer in turn must have the contents of the virtual machine (OS, Applications, operations, controls, etc.) independently assessed and meet PCI compliance in order that the entire stack of in-scope elements can be described as compliant.

Thus security — and more specifically compliance — in IaaS (and PaaS) is a shared responsibility.

I’ve spent many a blog battling marketing dragons from cloud providers that assert or imply that by only using said provider’s network which has undergone and passed one or more audits against a compliance framework, that any of its customers magically inherit certification by default. I trust this is recognized as completely false.

As compliance frameworks catch up to the unique use-cases that multi-tenancy and technologies such as virtualization bring, we’ll see more “compliant cloud” offerings spring up, easing customer pain related to the underlying moving parts.  This is, for example, what FedRAMP is aiming to provide with “pre-approved” cloud offerings.  We’ve got visibility and transparency issues to solve , as well as temporal issues such as the frequency and period of compliance audits, but there’s progress.

We’re going to see more and more of this as infrastructure- and platform-as-a-service vendors look to mutually accelerate compliance to achieve that which software-as-a-service can more organically deliver as a function of stack control.

/Hoff

* Note: It’s still a little unclear to me how some of the PCI requirements are met in an environment like an IaaS Cloud provider where “applications” that we typically think of that traffic in PCI in-scope data don’t exist (but the infrastructure does,) but I would assume that AWS leverages other certifications such as SAS and ISO as a cumulative to petition the QSA for consideration during certification.  I’ll ask this question of AWS and see what I get back.

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Navigating PCI DSS (2.0) – Related to Virtualization/Cloud, May the Schwartz Be With You!

November 1st, 2010 3 comments

[Disclaimer: I’m not a QSA. I don’t even play one on the Internet. Those who are will generally react to posts like these with the stock “it depends” answer, to which I respond “you’re right, it does.  Not sure where that leaves us other than with a collective sigh, but…]

The Payment Card Industry (PCI) last week released version 2.0 of the Data Security Standard (DSS.) [Legal agreement required]  This is an update from v1.2.1 but strangely does not introduce any major new requirements but instead clarifies language.

Accompanying this latest revision is also a guidance document titled “Navigating PCI DSS: Understanding the Intent of the Requirements, v2.0” [PDF]

One of the more interesting additions in the guidance is the direct call-out of virtualization which, although late to the game given the importance of this technology and its operational impact, is a welcome edition to this reader.  I should mention I’ve sat in on three of the virtualization SIG calls which gives me an interesting perspective as I read through the document.  Let me just summarize by saying that “…you can’t please all the people, all of the time…” 😉

What I find profoundly interesting is that since virtualization is a such a prominent and enabling foundational technology in IaaS Cloud offerings, the guidance is still written as though the multi-tenant issues surrounding cloud computing (as an extension of virtualization) don’t exist and that shared infrastructure doesn’t complicate the picture.  Certainly there are “cloud” providers who don’t use infrastructure shared with other providers beyond themselves in order to deliver service to different customers (I think we call them SaaS providers,) but think about the context of people wanting to use AWS to deliver services that are in scope for PCI.

Here’s what the navigation document has to say specific to virtualization and ultimately how that maps to IaaS cloud offerings.  We’re going to cover just the introductory paragraph in this post with the guidance elements and the actual DSS in a follow-on.  However, since many people are going to use this navigation document as their first blush, let’s see where that gets us:

PCI DSS requirements apply to all system components. In the context of PCI DSS, “system components” are defined as any network component, server or application that is included in, or connected to, the cardholder data environment. System components” also include any virtualization components such as virtual machines, virtual switches/routers, virtual appliances, virtual applications/desktops, and hypervisors.

I would have liked to see specific mention of virtual storage here and although it’s likely included by implication in the management system/sub-system mentions above and below, the direct mention of APIs. Thanks to heavy levels of automation, the operational movements related to DevOps and with APIs becoming the interface of the integration and management planes, these are unexplored lands for many.

I’m also inclined to wonder about virtualization approaches that is not server-centric such as physical networking devices, databases, etc.

If virtualization is implemented, all components within the virtual environment will need to be identified and considered in scope for the review, including the individual virtual hosts or devices, guest machines, applications, management interfaces, central management consoles, hypervisors, etc. All intra-host communications and data flows must be identified and documented, as well as those between the virtual component and other system components.

It can be quite interesting to imagine the scoping exercises (or de-scoping more specifically) associated with this requirement in a cloud environment.  Even if the virtualized platforms are operated solely on behalf of a single customer (read: no shared infrastructure — private cloud,)  this is still an onerous task, so I wonder how — if at all — this could be accomplished in a public IaaS offering given the lack of transparency we see in today’s cloud operators.  Much of what is being asked for relating to infrastructure and “data flows” between the “virtual component and other system components” represents the CSP’s secret sauce.

The implementation of a virtualized environment must meet the intent of all requirements, such that the virtualized systems can effectively be regarded as separate hardware. For example, there must be a clear segmentation of functions and segregation of networks with different security levels; segmentation should prevent the sharing of production and test/development environments; the virtual configuration must be secured such that vulnerabilities in one function cannot impact the security of other functions; and attached devices, such as USB/serial devices, should not be accessible by all virtual instances.

“…clear segmentation of functions and segregation of networks with different security levels” and “the virtual configuration must be secured such that vulnerabilities in one function cannot impact the security of other functions,” eh? I don’t see how anyone can expect to meet this requirement in any system underpinned with a virtualized infrastructure stack (hardware or software) whether it’s multi-tenant or not.  One vulnerability in the hypervisor makes this an impossibility.  Add in management, storage, networking. This basically comes down to trusting in the sanctity of the hypervisor.

Additionally, all virtual management interface protocols should be included in system documentation, and roles and permissions should be defined for managing virtual networks and virtual system components. Virtualization platforms must have the ability to enforce separation of duties and least privilege, to separate virtual network management from virtual server management.

Special care is also needed when implementing authentication controls to ensure that users authenticate to the proper virtual system components, and distinguish between the guest VMs (virtual machines) and the hypervisor.

The rest is pretty standard stuff, but if you read the guidance sections (next post) it gets even more fun.  This is why the subjectivity, expertise and experience of the QSA is so related to the quality of the audit when virtualization and cloud are involved.  For example, let’s take a sneak peek at section 2.2.1, as it is a bit juicy:

2.2.1 Implement only one primary function per server to prevent functions that require different security levels from co-existing
on the same server. (For example, web servers, database servers, and DNS should be implemented on separate servers.)
Note: Where virtualization technologies are in use, implement only one primary function per virtual system component
.

I  acknowledge that there are “cloud” providers who are PCI certified at the highest tier.  Many of them are SaaS providers.  Many simply use their own server stacks in co-located facilities but due to their size and services merely call themselves cloud providers — many aren’t even virtualized per the description above.   Further, there are also methods of limiting scope and newer technologies such as tokenization that can assist in solving some of the information-centric issues with what would otherwise be in-scope data, but they offset many of the cost-driven efficiencies marketed by mass-market, low-cost cloud providers today.

Love to hear from an IaaS public cloud provider who is PCI certified (to the VM boundary) with customers that are in turn certified with in-scope applications and cardholder data or even a SaaS provider who sits atop an IaaS provider…

Just read this first before responding, please.

/Hoff

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What’s The Problem With Cloud Security? There’s Too Much Of It…

October 17th, 2010 3 comments

Here’s the biggest challenge I see in Cloud deployment as the topic of security inevitably occurs in conversation:

There’s too much of it.

Huh?

More specifically, much like my points regarding networking in highly-virtualized multi-tenant environments — it’s everywhere — we’ve got the same problem with security.  Security is shot-gunned across the cloud landscape in a haphazard fashion…and the buck (pun intended) most definitely does not stop here.

The reality is that if you’re using IaaS, the lines of demarcation for the responsibility surrounding security may in one take seemed blurred but are in fact extremely well-delineated, and that’s the problem.  I’ve seen quite a few validated design documents outlining how to deploy “secure multi-tentant virtualized environments.”  One of them is 800 pages long.

Check out the diagram below.

I quickly mocked up an IaaS stack wherein you have the Cloud provider supplying, operating, managing and securing the underlying cloud hardware and software layers whilst the applications and information (contained within VM boundaries) are maintained by the consumer of these services.  The list of controls isn’t complete, but it gives you a rough idea of what gets focused on. Do you see some interesting overlaps?  How about gaps?

This is the issue; each one of those layers has security controls in it.  There is lots of duplication and there is lots of opportunity for things to be obscured or simply not accounted for at each layer.

Each of these layers and functional solutions is generally managed by different groups of people.  Each of them is generally managed by different methods and mechanisms.  In the case of IaaS, none of the controls at the hardware and software layers generally intercommunicate and given the abstraction provided as part of the service offering, all those security functions are made invisible to the things running in the VMs.

A practical issue is that the FW, VPN, IPS and LB functions at the hardware layer are completely separate from the FW, VPN, IPS and LB functions at the software layer which are in turn completely separate from the FW, VPN, IPS and LB functions which might be built into the VM’s (or virtual appliances) which sit stop them.

The security in the hardware is isolated from the security in the software which is isolated from the security in the workload.  You can, today, quite literally install the same capabilities up and down the stack without ever meeting in the middle.

That’s not only wasteful in terms of resources but incredibly prone to error in both construction, management and implementation (since at the core it’s all software, and software has defects.)

Keep in mind that at the provider level the majority of these security controls are focused on protecting the infrastructure, NOT the stuff atop it.  By design, these systems are blind to the workloads running atop them (which are often encrypted both at rest and in transit.)  In many cases this is why a provider may not be able to detect an “attack” beyond data such as flows/traffic.

To make things more interesting, in some cases the layer responsible for all that abstraction is now the most significant layer involved in securing the system as a whole and the fundamental security elements associated with the trust model we rely upon.

The hypervisor is an enormous liability; there’s no defense in depth when your primary security controls are provided by the (*ahem*) operating system provider.  How does one provide a compensating control when visibility/transparency [detective] are limited by design and there’s no easy way to provide preventative controls aside from the hooks the thing you’re trying to secure grants access to?

“Trust me” ain’t an appropriate answer.  We need better visibility and capabilities to robustly address this issue.  Unfortunately, there’s no standard for security ecosystem interoperability from a management, provisioning, orchestration or monitoring perspective even within a single stack layer.  There certainly isn’t across them.

In the case of Cloud providers who use commodity hardware with big, flat networks with little or no context for anything other than the flows/IP mappings running over them (thus the hardware layer is portrayed as truly commoditized,) how much better/worse do you think the overall security posture is of a consumer’s workload running atop this stack.  No, that’s not a rhetorical question.  I think the case could be argued either side of the line in the sand given the points I’ve made above.

This is the big suck.  Cloud security suffers from the exact same siloed security telemetry problems as legacy operational models…except now it does it at scale. This is why I’ve always made the case that one can’t “secure the Cloud” — at least not holistically — given this lego brick problem.   Everyone wants to make the claim that they’re technology is that which will be the first to solve this problem.  It ain’t going to happen. Not with the IaaS (or even PaaS) model, it won’t.

However, there is a big opportunity to move forward here.  How?  I’ll give you a hint.  It exists toward the left side of the diagram.

/Hoff

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VMware vCloud Director Security Hardening Guide Is Available

September 23rd, 2010 No comments
Image representing VMware as depicted in Crunc...
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I’ll be adding a material review of this document here later, but I wanted to make sure folks know this resource exists.

It’s titled the “VMware vCloud Director Security Hardening Guide”

You can download it here (PDF)

The Table of Contents appears reasonably robust…content is TBD

/Hoff

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VMware’s (New) vShield: The (Almost) Bottom Line

September 1st, 2010 2 comments

After my initial post yesterday (How To Wield the New vShield (Edge, App & Endpoint) remarking on the general sessions I sat through on vShield, I thought I’d add some additional color given my hands-on experience in the labs today.

I will reserve more extensive technical analysis of vShield Edge and App (I didn’t get to play with endpoint as there is not a lab for that) once I spend some additional quality-time with the products as they emerge.

Because people always desire for me to pop out of the cake quickly, here you go:

You should walk away from this post understanding that I think the approach holds promise within the scope of what VMware is trying to deliver. I think it can and will offer customers choice and flexibility in their security architecture and I think it addresses some serious segmentation, security and compliance gaps. It is a dramatically impactful set of solutions that is disruptive to the security and networking ecosystem. It should drive some interesting change. The proof, as they say, will be in the vPudding.

Let me first say that from VMware’s perspective I think vShield “2.0” (which logically represents many technologies and adjusted roadmaps both old and new) is clearly an important and integral part of both vSphere and vCloud Director’s future implementation strategies. It’s clear that VMware took a good, hard look at their security solution strategy and made some important and strategically-differentiated investments in this regard.

All things told, I think it’s a very good strategy for them and ultimately their customers. However, there will be some very interesting side-effects from these new features.

vShield Edge is as disruptive to the networking space (it provides L3+ networking, VPN, DHCP and NAT capabilities at the vDC edge) as it is to the security arena. When coupled with vShield App (and ultimately endpoint) you can expect VMware’s aggressive activity in retooling their offers here to cause further hastened organic development, investment, and consolidation via M&A in the security space as other vendors seek to play and complement the reabsorption of critical security capabilities back into the platform itself.

Now all of the goodness that this renewed security strategy brings also has some warts. I’ll get into some of them as I gain more hands-on experience and get some questions answered, but here’s the Cliff Note version with THREE really important points:

  1. The vShield suite is the more refined/retooled/repaired approach toward what VMware promised in delivery three years ago when I wrote about it in 2007 (Opening VMM/HyperVisors to Third Parties via API’s – Goodness or the Apocalypse?) and later in 2008 (VMware’s VMsafe: The Good, the Bad, and the Bubbly…“) and from 2009, lest we forget The Cart Before the Virtual Horse: VMware’s vShield/Zones vs. VMsafe API’s
    _
    Specifically, as the virtualization platform has matured, so has the Company’s realization that security is something they are going to have to take seriously and productize themselves as depending upon an ecosystem wasn’t working — mostly because doing so meant that the ecosystem had to uproot entire product roadmaps to deliver solutions and it was a game of “supply vs. demand chicken.”
    _
    However, much of this new capability isn’t fully baked yet, especially from the perspective of integration and usability and even feature set capabilities such as IPv6 support. Endpoint is basically the more streamlined application of APIs and libraries for anti-malware offloading so as to relieve a third party ISV from having to write fastpath drivers that sit in the kernel/VMM and disrupt their roadmaps. vShield App is the Zones solution polished to provide inter-VM firewalling capabilities.
    _
    Edge is really the new piece here and represents a new function to represent vDC perimeterized security capabilities.Many of these features are billed — quite openly — as relieving a customer from needing to use/deploy physical networking or security products. In fact, in some cases even virtual networking products such as the Cisco Nexus 1000v are not usable/supportable. This is and example of a reasonably closed, software-driven world of Cloud where the underlying infrastructure below the hypervisor doesn’t matter…until it does.
    _
  2. vShield Edge and App are, in the way they are currently configured and managed, very complex and unwieldy and the performance, resiliency and scale described in some of the sessions is yet unproven and in some cases represents serious architectural deficiencies at first blush. There are some nasty single points of failure in the engineering (as described) and it’s unclear how many reference architectures for large enterprise and service provider scale Cloud use have really been thought through given some of these issues.
    _
    As an example, only being able to instantiate a single (but required) vShield App virtual appliance per ESX host brings into focus serious scale, security architecture and resilience issues. Being able to deploy numerous Edge appliances brings into focus manageability and policy sprawl concerns.There are so many knobs and levers leveraged across the stack that it’s going to be very difficult in large environments to reconcile policy spread over the three (I only interacted with two) components and that says nothing about then integrating/interoperating with third party vSwitches, physical switches, virtual and physical security appliances. If you think it was challenging before, you ain’t seen nothin’ yet.
    _
  3. The current deployment methodology reignites the battle that started to rage when security teams lost visibility into the security and networking layers and the virtual administrators controlled the infrastructure from the pNIC up. This takes the gap-filler virtual security solutions from small third parties such as Altor which played nicely with vCenter but allowed the security teams to manage policy and blows that model up. Now, security enforcement is a commodity feature delivered via the virtualization platform but requires too complex a set of knowledge and expertise of the underlying virtualization platform to be rendered effective by role-driven security teams.

While I’ll cover items #1 and #2 in a follow-on post, here’s what VMware can do in the short term to remedy what I think is a huges issue going forward with item #3, usability and management.

Specifically, in the same way vCloud Director sits above vCenter and abstracts away much of the “unnecessary internals” to present a simplified service catalog of resources/services to a consumer, VMware needs to provide a dedicated security administrator’s “portal” or management plane which unites the creation, management and deployment of policy from a SECURITY perspective of the various disparate functions offered by vShield App, Edge and Endpoint. [ED: This looks as though this might be what vShield Manager will address. There were no labs covering this and no session I saw gave any details on this offering (UI or API)]

If you expect a security administrator to have the in-depth knowledge of how to administer the entire (complex) virtualization platform in order to manage security, this model will break and cause tremendous friction. A security administrator shouldn’t have access to vCenter directly or even the vCloud Director interfaces.

Since much of the capability for automation and configuration is made available via API, the notion of building a purposed security interface to do so shouldn’t be that big of a deal. Some people might say that VMware should focus on building API capabilities and allow the ecosystem to fill the void with solutions that take advantage of the interfaces. The problem is that this strategy has not produced solutions that have enjoyed traction today and it’s quite clear that VMware is interested in controlling their own destiny in terms of Edge and App while allowing the rest of the world to play with Endpoint.

I’m sure I’m missing things and that given the exposure I’ve had (without any in-depth briefings) there may be material issues associated with where the products are given their early status, but I think it important to get these thoughts out of my head so I can chart their accuracy and it gives me a good reference point to direct the product managers to when they want to scalp me for heresy.

There’s an enormous amount of detail that I want to/can get into. The last time I did that it ended up in a 150 slide presentation I delivered at Black Hat…

Allow me to reiterate what I said in the beginning:

You should walk away from this post understanding that I think the approach holds promised within the scope of what VMware is trying to deliver. I think it can and will offer customers choice and flexibility in their security architecture and I think it addresses some serious segmentation, security and compliance gaps. It is a dramatically impactful set of solutions that is disruptive to the security and networking ecosystem. It should drive some interesting change. The proof, as they say, will be in the vPudding.

…and we all love vPudding.

/Hoff

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How To Wield the New vShield (Edge, App & Endpoint)

August 30th, 2010 4 comments
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Today at VMworld I spent my day in and out of sessions focused on the security of virtualized and cloud environments.

Many of these security sessions hinged on the release of VMware‘s new and improved suite of vShield product offerings which can be simply summarized by a deceptively simple set of descriptions:

  • vShield Edge – Think perimeter firewalling for the virtual datacenter (L3 and above)
  • vShield App – Think internal segmentation and zoning (L2)
  • vShield Endpoint – Anti-malware service offload

The promised capabilities of these solutions offer quite a well-rounded set of capabilities from a network and security perspective but there are many interesting things to consider as one looks at the melding of the VMsafe API, vShield Zones and the nepotistic relationship enjoyed between the vCloud (nee’ VMware vCloud Director) and vSphere platforms.

There are a series of capabilities emerging which seek to solve many of the constraints associated with multi-tenancy and scale challenges of heavily virtualized enterprise and service provider virtual data center environments.  However, many of the issues associated with those I raised in the Four Horsemen of the Virtualization Security Apocalypse still stand (performance, resilience/scale, management and cost) — especially since many of these features are delivered in the form of a virtual appliance.

Many of the issues I raise above (and asked again today in session) don’t have satisfactory answers which just shows you how immature we still are in our solution portfolios.

I’ll be diving deeper into each of the components as the week proceeds (and more details around vCloud Director are made available,) but one thing is certain — there’s a very interesting amplification of the existing tug-of-war  between the security capabilities/functionality provided by the virtualization/cloud platform providers and the network/security ecosystem trying to find relevance and alignment with them.

There is going to be a wringing out of the last few smaller virtualization/Cloud security players who have not yet been consolidated via M&A or attrition (Altor Networks, Catbird, HyTrust, Reflex, etc) as the three technologies above either further highlight an identified gap or demonstrate irrelevance in the face of capabilities “built-in” (even if you have to pay for them) by VMware themselves.

Further, the uneasy tension between  the classical physical networking vendors and the virtualization/cloud platform providers is going to come to a boil, especially as it comes to configuration management, compliance, and reporting as the differentiators between simple integration at the API level of control and data plane capabilities and things like virtual firewalling (and AV, and overlay VPNs and policy zoning) begins to commoditize.

As I’ve mentioned before, it’s not where the network *is* in a virtualized environment, it’s where it *isn’t* — the definition of where the network starts and stops is getting more and more abstracted.   This in turn drives the same conversation as it relates to security.  How we’re going to define, provision, orchestrate, and govern these virtual data centers concerns me greatly as there are so many touchpoints.

Hopefully this starts to get a little more clear as more and more of the infrastructure (virtual and physical) become manageable via API such that ultimately you won’t care WHAT tool is used to manage networking/security or even HOW other than the fact that policy can be defined consistently and implemented/instantiated via API across all levels transparently, regardless of what’s powering the moving parts.

This goes back to the discussions (video) I had with Simon Crosby on who should own security in virtualized environments and why (blog).

Now all this near term confusion and mess isn’t necessarily a bad thing because it’s going to force further investment, innovation and focus on problem solving that’s simply been stalled in the absence of both technology readiness, customer appetite and compliance alignment.

More later this week. [Ed: You can find the follow-on to this post here “VMware’s (New) vShield: The (Almost) Bottom Line]

/Hoff

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