Archive for November, 2008

Cloud Computing Security: From DDoS (Distributed Denial Of Service) to EDoS (Economic Denial of Sustainability)

November 27th, 2008 12 comments

It's Thanksgiving here in the U.S., so in between baking, roasting and watching Risk Astley rickroll millions in the Macy's Thanksgiving Day Parade, I had a thought about how the utility and agility of the cloud computing models such as Amazon AWS (EC2/S3) and the pricing models that go along with them can actually pose a very nasty risk to those who use the cloud to provide service.

That thought — in between vigorous whisking during cranberry sauce construction — got me noodling about how the pay-as-you-go model could be used for nefarious means.

Specifically, this usage-based model potentially enables $evil_person who knows that a service is cloud-based to manipulate service usage billing in orders of magnitude that could be disguised easily as legitimate use of the service but drive costs to unmanageable levels. 

If you take Amazon's AWS usage-based pricing model (check out the cost calculator here,) one might envision that instead of worrying about a lack of resources, the elasticity of the cloud could actually provide a surplus of compute, network and storage utility that could be just as bad as a deficit.

Instead of worrying about Distributed Denial of Service (DDos) attacks from botnets and the like, imagine having to worry about delicately balancing forecasted need with capabilities like Cloudbursting to deal with a botnet designed to make seemingly legitimate requests for service to generate an economic denial of sustainability (EDoS) — where the dyamicism of the infrastructure allows scaling of service beyond the economic means of the vendor to pay their cloud-based service bills.

Imagine the shock of realizing that the outsourcing to the cloud to reduce CapEx and move to an OpEx model just meant that while availability, confidentiality and integrity of your service and assets are solid, your sustainability and survivability are threatened.

I know there exists the ability to control instance sprawl and constrain costs, but imagine if this is managed improperly or inexactly because we can't distinguish between legitimate and targeted resource consumption from an "attack."

If you're in the business of ensuring availability of service for large events on the web for a timed event, are you really going to limit service when you think it might drive revenues?

I think this is where service governors will have to get much more
intelligent regarding how services are being consumed and how that
affects the transaction supply chain and embed logic that takes into
account financial risk when scaling to ensure EDoS doesn't kill you. 

I can't say that I haven't had similar concerns when dealing with scalability and capacity planning in hosted or dedicated co-location environments, but generally storage and compute were not billable service options I had to worry about, only network bandwidth.

Back to the mashed potatoes.


The Big Four Cloud Computing Providers: Security Compared (Part I)

November 26th, 2008 1 comment

James Urquhart posted a summary a week or so ago of what he described as the "Big 4" players in Cloud Computing.  It was a slightly humorous pass at describing their approaches and offerings:

Below is a table that lists these key players, and compares their offerings from the perspective of four core defining aspects of clouds. As this is a comparison of apples to oranges to grapefruit to perhaps pastrami, it is not meant to be a ranking of the participants, nor a judgement of when to choose one over the other. Instead, what I hope to do here is to give a working sysadmin's glimpse into what these four clouds are about, and why they are each unique approaches to enterprise cloud computing in their own right.

James provided quite a bit more (serious) detail in the text below his table which I present to you here, tarted up with a column I've added and James left off titled "Security." 

It's written in the same spirit as James' original, so feel free to take this with an equally well-provisioned grain of NaCl.  I'll be adding my own perfunctory comments with a little more detail shortly:Big4cloud The point here is that the quantification of what "security" means in the cloud is as abstracted and varied as the platforms that provide the service.  We're essentially being asked to take for granted and trust that the underlying mechanicals are sound and secure while not knowing where or what they are.

We don't do that with our physically-tethered operating systems today, so why should we do so with virtualization platform hypervisors and the infrastructure "data center operating systems" of the cloud?  The transparency provided by dedicated infrastructure is being obscured by virtualization and the fog of the cloud.  It's a squeezing the balloon problem.

And so far as the argument goes toward suggesting that this is no different than what we deal with n terms of SaaS today, the difference between what we might define as legacy SaaS and "cloud" is that generally it's someone elses' apps and your data in the former (ye olde ASP model.) 

In the case of the "cloud," it could be a mixture of applications and data, some of which you own, some you don't and some you're simply not even aware of, perhaps running in part on your infrastructure and someone elses'.

It should be noted also that not all cloud providers (excluding those above) even own and operate the platforms they provide you service on…they, in turn, could be utilizing shared infrastructure to provide you service, so cross-pollination of service provisioning could affect portability, reliability and security.

That is why the Big4 above stand up their own multi-billion dollar data centers; they keep the architecture proprietary so you don't have to; lots of little clouds everywhere.


P.S. If you're involved with platform security from any of the providers above, do contact me because I'm going to be expounding upon the security "layers" of each of these providers in as much detail as I have here shortly.  I'd suggest you might be interested in assuring it's as complete and accurate as possible 😉

Cloud Providers Are Better At Securing Your Data Than You Are…

November 21st, 2008 4 comments

"Cloud Providers Are Better At Securing Your Data Than You Are…"

To some, this is a contentious point while to others it seems entirely logical.

I must tell you that I've witnessed this very assertion as it has been raised more times in the last few days than I can count.

Before I get into any more juicy bits regarding this topic, I wonder if you wouldn't mind popping over and reading a blog post I wrote in August, 2007 titled "On-Demand SaaS Vendors Able to Secure Assets Better than Customers?

Come to think of it, you can read the follow-on post to that one which clearly indicated my point when and (you know, those so-called "Cloud" providers) were breached.

Forgot about those breaches, did you?  Oh, that must have been because they were SaaS providers and not Cloud providers at the time.  Gotcha.

As you read these posts, first do so within the context of what we've come to know as software as a service (SaaS.)  Then kindly re-read it and substitute 'SaaS' with 'Cloud,' won't you?


I have more, but I'll wait till you're done.


PDP Says “The Cloud Is Not That Insecure” & Implies Security Concerns Are Trivial…

November 21st, 2008 No comments

I haven't been whipped into this much of a frenzy since Hormel changed the labels on the SPAM cans in Hawaii.

PDP (of gnucitizen fame) masterfully stitched together a collection of mixed metaphors, generalizations, reductions to the ridiculous and pejoratives to produce his opus magnum on cloud computing (in)security titled "The Cloud Is Not That Insecure."


Since I have spent the better part of my security career building large "cloud-like" services and the products that help, at a minimum, to secure them, I feel at least slightly qualified to dispute many of his points, the bulk of which are really focused on purely technology-driven mechanical analogies and platforms rather than items such as the operational, trust, political, jurisdictional, regulatory, organizational and economical issues that really go toward the "security" (or lack thereof) of "cloud-based" service.

Speaking of which, PDP's definition of the cloud is about as abstract as you can get:

"Cloud technologies are in fact no different than non-cloud technologies. Practically they are the same. I mean the term cloud computing
is quite broad and perhaps it is even a buzword rather than a
well-thought term which describes a particular study of the IT field.
To me cloud computing refers to the process of outsourcing computer cycles and memory keeping scalability in mind."

Well, I'm glad we cleared that up.

At any rate, it's a seriously humorous read that would have me taking apart many of his contradictory assumptions and assertions were it not for the fact that I have actual work to do.  So, in the issue of time, I'll offer up his conclusion and you can go back and read the rest:

So, is the cloud secure? I would say yes if you know what you are
doing. A couple of posts back I mentioned that cloud security matters.
It still does. Cloud technologies are quite secure because we tend not
to trust them.
However, because cloud computing can be quite confusing,
you still need to spend time in making sure that all the blocks fit
together nicely.

So, there you have it.  Those of you who "know what you are doing" are otay and thanks to security by obscurity due to a lack of trust, cloud computing is secure.  That's not confusing at all…

This probably won't end well, but…



Disruption/Delay Tolerant Networking: To Proudly Ping Where No Man Has Pinged Before…

November 20th, 2008 4 comments

Phonehome…'cos there ain't no clouds in outer space…

The fine folks at NASA, with notable contributors such as the Internet's baby-daddy Vint Cerf, have been bit twiddling a new communications protocol this month that has been in the works since 1998.  The "launch" of Delay/Disruption Tolerant Networking protocol is currently being field tested on the comet-seeking EPOXI spacecraft.

While TCP/IP has generally worked well beyond its initial design requirements as the terrestrial Internet has scaled unimaginably, it doesn't work so well in interplanetary deep space.

From the fine folks at Ars Technica:

This month, NASA began testing a new protocol
for communications in outer space that could extend the reliability and
versatility of the Internet out of the Earth's atmosphere. The new
protocol, called Disruption-Tolerant Networking, or DTN, has been in
the works for ten years, passed a month of testing with a just-launched
spacecraft and nine ground stations, but is still scheduled to undergo
further tests.

Communicating in interplanetary space is hard. While even the most
remote regions of the earth can be reached by lightspeed communications
in a modest fraction of a second, and voice conversations from the
earth to the moon can be carried out with only a barely noticeable
delay, several light minutes separate planets even at their closest
approaches. Back-and-forth negotiation isn't feasible, and the cost of
starting processes from scratch are high. Furthermore, disruptions of
communication are numerous  and routine. Satellites and planetary
probes have much less power when they're out of the sun, line of sight
must be maintained, dishes properly aimed, etc. Solar flares and other
environmental factors can shut communications channels unexpectedly.

Under the new DTN protocol, nodes retain data in their own memory until
they receive confirmation the data has been received by a suitable
target node. This increases the likelihood that data will arrive at its
destination with a minimum of back-and-forth, communication even when
communication is intermittent or unreliable. 

I wonder if it's IPv6 compatible?  After we assign a DTN/IP-Address to Internet-enable each celestial body, we'll be out of addresses again!

BTW, I happen to have access to a DTN-enabled uplink which proxy relays my TCP/IP to DTN through the EPOXI spacecraft.  Check out the round-trip times on this badboy:

Zeitgeist:~ choff$ ping
PING ( 56 data bytes
64 bytes from icmp_seq=0 ttl=252 time=1662.194 lightyears
64 bytes from icmp_seq=1 ttl=252 time=109.738 lightyears
64 bytes from icmp_seq=2 ttl=252 time=109.098 lightyears
64 bytes from icmp_seq=3 ttl=252 time=109.165 lightyears
64 bytes from icmp_seq=4 ttl=252 time=99.230 lightyears
64 bytes from icmp_seq=5 ttl=252 time=101.702 lightyears
— ping statistics —
6 packets transmitted, 6 packets received, 0% packet loss
round-trip min/avg/max/stddev = 99.230/365.188/1662.194/580.053 lightyears
Zeitgeist:~ choff$

I am interested in understanding if there are any additional security
mechanisms built into DTN as it would be a shame if an advanced alien
race could perform an interplanetary MITM on our transmissions:
"…this is not the planet you are looking for…"

For the sake of humanity I hope so.  I'm going to go read the drafts.

Botnets?  Data leakage?  Clickjacking?  You think you've got problems,
just think of the firewalls needed to protect against solar flares ;)*


Categories: Jackassery Tags:

Beware the Transparent Proxy…Your Faith In VPNs Might Waiver

November 20th, 2008 9 comments

Aviram from the Securiteam blog wrote a post titled "Who's Your SMTP Daddy?" that caught my eye regarding the false sense of security that use of corporate IPSec VPNs brings to traveling road warriors due to the use by providers of so-called transparent proxies.

Let's say that you've got some sort of IPSec VPN solution installed on your laptop using the standard corporate configuration with your mail client pointing to  Your machine has AV, HIPS, firewall, etc.

You connect to a provider's network (wired, wifi, hotel, airport, etc…) and fire up your VPN client which authenticates just fine.  You then launch your mail client and type a quick note to your CEO about the confidential M&A project you're working on.  A few minutes later you get a response from your CEO to proceed with the tender.

You disconnect.

Here's the problem: that SMTP session you thought was encrypted through your VPN back to the corporate mail server was actually sent in the clear.  In fact, it wasn't even sent through your mail relay/server.

Here's a great example of why taken from Aviram's blog:

A quick investigation shows the following: The hotel’s network blocks
my VPN (as some of them do) but happily resolves any unresolvable host
name (such as my SMTP server’s hostname). This is resolved to a
catch-all server that proxies everything. Transparently. (well, almost)

Lesson learned. Changed the hostname to the IP, and will soon switch
to SSL based SMTP who will authenticate the server. In the meanwhile –
be careful from helpful Beijing wifi providers who are only too happy
to forward your mail on! (with some changes, of course).

Aviram is in China, but this example is valid in many countries and you can probably expect that given the behavior of some domestic ISP's, Telcos and Mobile Operators that it is or will go on here too.  It could easily work with other protocols that aren't sensitive to session tampering/MITM.*  Further, Aviram's example was about interception.  There's every reason to believe that one could expect the content of your email to be modified also…

I personally use SSL authenticated SMTP with valid issued certificates so at least if there is tampering with my session, my mail client barfs letting me know something is wrong.  That error probably wouldn't help the average sales droid in the field as he/she would just click OK like most people do to any security error that pops up, but it's worth considering.


* Obviously this example presents a worst case scenario with certain configuration assumptions and license taken for illustration, but take the message for what it's intended: blind faith in VPNs can cause you some serious heartache.  Transparent proxies work very well…

Categories: Information Security Tags:

Links for 2008-11-17 [No, I don’t use]

November 17th, 2008 3 comments
Categories: Uncategorized Tags:

CohesiveFT VPN-Cubed: Not Your Daddy’s Encrypted Tunnel

November 14th, 2008 4 comments

I had a  briefing with Patrick Kerpan and Craig Heimark of CohesiveFT last week in response to some comments that Craig had left on my blog post regarding PCI compliance in the Cloud, here

I was intrigued, albeit skeptically, with how CohesiveFT was positioning the use of VPNs within the cloud and differentiating their solution from the very well established IPSec and SSL VPN capabilities we all know and love.  What's so special about tunnels across the Intertubes?  Been there, done that, bought the T-Shirt, right?

So I asked the questions…

I have to say that unlike many other companies rushing to associate their brand by rubber cementing the word "cloud" and "security" onto their product names and marketing materials, CohesiveFT spent considerable time upfront describing what they do not do so as to effectively establish what they are and what they do.  I'll let one of their slides do the talking:


Okay, so they're not a cloud, but they provide cloud and virtualization services…and VPN-Cubed provides some layer of security along with their products and services…check. But…

Digging a little deeper, I still sought to understand why I couldn't just stand up an IPSec tunnel from my corporate datacenter to one or more cloud providers where my assets and data were hosted.  I asked for two things: (1) A couple of sentences summarizing their elevator pitch for VPN-Cubed and (2) a visual representation of what this might look like.

Here's what I got as an answer to question (1):

"VPN-Cubed is a novel implementation of VPN concepts which provides a customer controlled security perimeter within a third-party controlled (cloud, utility infra, hosting provider) computing facility, across multiple third-party controlled computing facilities, or for use in private infrastructure.  It enables customer control of their infrastructure topology by allowing control of the network addressing scheme, encrypted communications, and the use of what might normally be unrouteable protocols such as UDP Multicast."

Here are two great visuals to address question (2):



So the differences between a typical VPN and VPN-Cubed comes down to being able to securely extend your "internal clouds infrastructure" in your datacenters (gasp! I said it) in a highly-available manner to include your externally hosted assets which in turn run on infrastructure you don't own.  You can't stand up an ASA or Neoteris box on a network you can't get to.  The VPN-Cubed Managers are VM's/VA's that run as a complement to your virtual servers/machines hosted by your choice of one or multiple cloud providers.

They become the highly-available, multiprotocol aribters of access via standardized IPSec protocols but do so in a way that addresses the dynamic capabilities of the cloud which includes service governance, load, and "cloudbursting" failover between clouds — in a transparent manner.

Essentially you get secure access to your critical assets utilizing an infrastructure independent solution, extending the VLAN segmentation, isolation and security capabilities your providers may put in place while also controlling your address spaces within the cloudspaces encompassing your VM's "behind" the VPN Managers.

VPN-Cubed is really a prime example of the collision space of dynamic application/service delivery, virtualization, security and cloud capacity governance.
  It speaks a lot to re-perimeterization that I've been yapping about for quite some time and hints at Greg Ness' Infrastructure 2.0 meme.

Currently VPN-Cubed is bundled as a package which includes both product and services and supports the majority of market-leading virtualization formats, operating systems and cloud providers such as Amazon EC2, Flexiscale, GoGrid, Mosso, etc.

It's a very slick offering.


BeanSec! Wednesday, November 19th, 2008 – 6PM to ?

November 14th, 2008 4 comments

Yo!  BeanSec! is once again upon us.  Wednesday, November 19th, 2008.
Middlesex Lounge: 315 Massachusetts Ave, Cambridge 02139. 

BeanSec! is an informal meetup of information security
professionals, researchers and academics in the Greater Boston area
that meets the third Wednesday of each month.

I say again, BeanSec! is hosted the third Wednesday of every month.  Add it to your calendar.

Come get your grub on.  Lots of good people show up.  Really.

Unlike other meetings, you will not be expected to pay dues, “join
up”, present a zero-day exploit, or defend your dissertation to attend.

This week we have a special guest attendee from the UK/France/Hungary*: Craig Balding – Security Pro and Cloud Security Blogger (

Don't worry about being "late" because most people just show up when
they can. 6:30 is a good time to aim for. We'll try and save you a
seat. There is a plenty of parking around or take the T.

In case you're wondering, we're getting about 30 people on average
per BeanSec! Weld, 0Day and I have been at this for just almost 2 years
and without actually *doing* anything, it's turned out swell.

The food selection is basically high-end finger-food appetizers and
the drinks are really good; an attentive staff and eclectic clientèle
make the joint fun for people watching. I'll generally annoy you into participating somehow, even if it's just fetching napkins. 😉

See you there.

/Hoff, /0Day, and /Weld

*The "France" thing was a joke but my strikethrough formatting didn't come out right…you can tell it worked by Craig's comments below 😉

Categories: BeanSec! Tags:

Cloud Security Macro Layers? I’ll Take “It’ll Never Sell” For $1000, Alex…

November 13th, 2008 2 comments

Mogull commented yesterday on my post regarding TCG's IF-MAP and remarked that in discussing cloud security and security models, the majority of folks, myself included, were focusing on the network:

Chris’s posting, and most of the ones I’ve seen, are heavily focused
on network security concepts as they relate to the cloud. But if we
look at cloud computing at the macro level, there are additional layers
which are just as critical (in no particular order):


  • Network: The usual network security controls.
  • Service: Security around the exposed APIs and services.
  • User: Authentication- which in the cloud world, needs to
    move to more adaptive authentication, rather than our current static
    username/password model.
  • Transaction: Security controls around individual transactions- via transaction authentication, adaptive authorization, and other approaches.
  • Data: Information-centric security controls for cloud
    based data. How’s that for buzzword bingo? Okay, this actually includes
    security controls for the back-end data, distributed data, and any
    content exchanged with the user.

I'd say that's a reasonable assertion and a valid set of additional "layers."  There also not especially unique and as such, I think Rich is himself a little disoriented by the fog of the cloud because as you'll read, the same could be said of any networked technology.

The reason we start with the network and usually find ourselves back where we started in this discussion is because the other stuff Rich mentions is just too damned hard, costs too much, is difficult to sell, isn't standardized, is generally platform dependent and is really intrusive.  See this post (Security Will Not End Up In the Network) as an example.

Need proof of how good ideas like this get mangled?  How about Web 2.0 or SOA which is for lack of a better description, exactly what RIch described in his model above; loosely coupled functional components of a modular architecture. 

We haven't even gotten close to having this solved internally on our firewalled enterprise LANs so it's somewhat apparent why it might appear to be missing in conversations regarding "the cloud."  It shouldn't be, but it is. 

It should be noted, however that there is a ton of work, solutions and initiatives that exist and continue to be worked on these topics, it's just not a priority as is evidenced by how people exercise their wallets.

And finally:

Down the road we’ll dig into these in more detail, but any time we
start distributing services and functionality over an open public
network with no inherent security controls, we need to focus on the
design issues and reduce design flaws as early as possible. We can’t
just look at this as a network problem- our authentication,
authorization, information, and service (layer 7) controls are likely
even more important.

I believe we call this thing of which he speaks, "the Internet."  I think we're about 20 years late. 😉


Categories: Cloud Computing, Virtualization Tags: