Posts Tagged ‘SDN’

Wanna Be A Security Player? Deliver It In Software As A Service Layer…

January 9th, 2013 1 comment

As I continue to think about the opportunities that Software Defined Networking (SDN) and Network Function Virtualization (NFV) bring into focus, the capability to deliver security as a service layer is indeed exciting.

I wrote about how SDN and OpenFlow (as a functional example) and the security use cases provided by each will be a differentiating capability back in 2011: The Killer App For OpenFlow and SDN? SecurityOpenFlow & SDN – Looking forward to SDNS: Software Defined Network Security, and Back To The Future: Network Segmentation & More Moaning About Zoning.

Recent activity in the space has done nothing but reinforce this opinion.  My day job isn’t exactly lacking in excitement, either :)

As many networking vendors begin to bring their SDN solutions to market — whether in the form of networking equipment or controllers designed to interact with them — one of the missing strategic components is security.  This isn’t a new phenomenon, unfortunately, and as such, predictably there are also now startups entering this space and/or retooling from the virtualization space and stealthily advertising themselves as “SDN Security” companies :)

Like we’ve seen many times before, security is often described (confused?) as a “simple” or “atomic” service and so SDN networking solutions are designed with the thought that security will simply be “bolted on” after the fact and deployed not unlike a network service such as “load balancing.”  The old “we’ll just fire up some VMs and TAMO (Then a Miracle Occurs) we’ve got security!” scenario.  Or worse yet, we’ll develop some proprietary protocol or insertion architecture that will magically get traffic to and from physical security controls (witness the “U-TURN” or “horseshoe” L2/L3 solutions of yesteryear.)

The challenge is that much of Security today is still very topologically sensitive and depends upon classical networking constructs to be either physically or logically plumbed between the “outside” and the asset under protection, or it’s very platform dependent and lacks the ability to truly define a policy that travels with the workload regardless of the virtualization, underlay OR overlay solutions.

Depending upon the type of control, security is often operationalized across multiple layers using wildly different constructs, APIs and context in terms of policy and disposition depending upon it’s desired effect.

Virtualization has certainly evolved our thinking about how we should think differently about security mostly due to the dynamism and mobility that virtualization has introduced, but it’s still incredibly nascent in terms of exposed security capabilities in the platforms themselves.  It’s been almost 5 years since I started raging about how we need(ed) platform providers to give us capabilities that function across stacks so we’d have a fighting chance.  To date, not only do we have perhaps ONE vendor doing some of this, but we’ve seen the emergence of others who are maniacally focused on providing as little of it as possible.

If you think about what virtualization offers us today from a security perspective, we have the following general solution options:

  1. Hypervisor-based security solutions which may apply policy as a function of the virtual-NIC card of the workloads it protects.
  2. Extensions of virtual-networking (i.e. switching) solutions that enable traffic steering and some policy enforcement that often depend upon…
  3. Virtual Appliance-based security solutions that require manual or automated provisioning, orchestration and policy application in user space that may or may not utilize APIs exposed by the virtual networking layer or hypervisor

There are tradeoffs across each of these solutions; scale, performance, manageability, statefulness, platform dependencies, etc.  There simply aren’t many platforms that natively offer security capabilities as a function of service delivery that allows arbitrary service definition with consistent and uniform ways of describing the outcome of the policies at these various layers.  I covered this back in 2008 (it’s a shame nothing has really changed) in my Four Horsemen Of the Virtual Security Apocalypse presentation.

As I’ve complained for years, we still have 20 different ways of defining how to instantiate a five-tupule ACL as a basic firewall function.

Out of the Darkness…

The promise of SDN truly realized — the ability to separate the control, forwarding, management and services planes — and deploy security as a function of available service components across overlays and underlays, means we will be able to take advantage of any of these models so long as we have a way to programmatically interface with the various strata regardless of whether we provision at the physical, virtual or overlay virtual layer.

It’s truly exciting.  We’re seeing some real effort to enable true security service delivery.

When I think about how to categorize the intersection of “SDN” and “Security,” I think about it the same way I have with virtualization and Cloud:

  • Securing SDN (Securing the SDN components)
  • SDN Security Services (How do I take security and use SDN to deliver security as a service)
  • Security via SDN (What NEW security capabilities can be derived from SDN)

There are numerous opportunities with each of these categories to really make a difference to security in the coming years.

The notion that many of our network and security capabilities are becoming programmatic means we *really* need to focus on securing SDN solutions, especially given the potential for abuse given the separation of the various channels. (See: Software Defined Networking (In)Security: All Your Control Plane Are Belong To Us…)

Delivering security as a service via SDN holds enormous promise for reasons I’ve already articulated and gives us an amazing foundation upon which to start building solutions we can’t imagine today given the lack of dynamism in our security architecture and design patterns.

Finally, the first two elements give rise to allow us to do things we can’t even imagine with today’s traditional physical and even virtual solutions.

I’ll be starting to highlight really interesting solutions I find (and am able to talk about) over the next few months.

Security enabled by SDN is going to be huge.

More soon.


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The Tyranny Of Taming (Network) Traffic: Steering, Service Insertion and Chaining…

November 29th, 2012 No comments

You know what’s hard?

Describing the difficulties to anyone who doesn’t work inside of an actual “networking” company why the notions of traffic steering, services insertion and chaining across multiple physical boxes and/or combinations of physical and virtual service instantiations is freaking difficult.

12/3/12 [Ed: I realized I didn't actually define these terms.  Added below.]

What do I mean by these terms?  Simplified definitions here:

  • Traffic Steering: directing and delivering traffic (flows/packets, tagged or otherwise) from one processing point to another
  • Service Insertion: addition of some form of processing (terminated or mirrored,) delivered as a service, that is interposed dynamically between processing points
  • Service Chaining: chaining (serialized or parallelized) and insertion of services with other services.
I didn’t get into the nuances of these capabilities with things like state, flow to service mapping tables, replication across flow/state tables in “clustered” processing points, etc., but I spoke to some of them in the “Four Horsemen of the Virtualization Security Apocalypse” presentation. See Pwnie #1 - War | Episode 7: Revenge Of the UTM Clones.

Now, with that out of the way and these terms simply defined, I suppose the “networking is simple” people are right.

I mean, all you have to do is agree on a common set of protocols, a consistent tagging format, flow and/or packet metadata, disposition mechanisms, flow redirection mechanisms beyond next hop unicast, tunneling, support for protocols other than unicast, state machine handling across disparate service chains, performance/availability/QoS telemetry across network domains and diameters, disparate control and data planes, session termination versus pass-through deltas, and then incidental stuff like MAC and routing table updates with convergence latencies across distributed entities, etc.

…and support for legacy while we’re at it.

It ain’t nuthin’ but a peanut, right?

Oh, this just must be an issue with underlay (physical) networks, right?

Overlays have this handled, right?

All these new APIs and control planes are secure by default, too, right?


Glad we’ve got this covered, apparently:

Things need to change dramatically at networking companies

This is true, by the way.

However, allow me to suggest that networking companies have experience, footprint, capabilities and relationships and are quite motivated to add value, increase feature velocity, reduce complexity in deployment and operation, and add more efficiency to their solutions.

Change is good.

See 18:45 if you want the juicy bits.



SiliconAngle Cube: Hoff On Security – Live At VMworld 2012

August 31st, 2012 3 comments

I was thrilled to be invited back to the SiliconAngle Cube at VMworld 2012 where John Furrier, Dave Vellante and I spoke in depth about security, virtualization and software defined networking (SDN)

I really like the way the chat turned out — high octane, fast pace and some great questions!

Here is the amazing full list of speakers during the event.  Check it out, ESPECIALLY Martin Casado’s talk.

As I told him, I think he is like my Obi Wan…my only hope for convincing my friends at VMware that networking and security require more attention and a real embrace of the ecosystem…

I’d love to hear your feedback on the video.



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Software Defined Networking (In)Security: All Your Control Plane Are Belong To Us…

August 20th, 2012 No comments

My next series of talks are focused around the emerging technology, solutions and security architectures of so-called “Software Defined Networking (SDN)”

As this space heats up, I see a huge opportunity for new and interesting ways in which security can be delivered — the killer app? — but I also am concerned that, per usual, security is a potential after thought.

At an absolute minimum example, the separation of control and data planes (much as what we saw with compute-centric virtualization) means we now have additional (or at least bifurcated) attack surfaces and threat vectors.  And not unlike compute-centric virtualization, the C&C channels for network operation represents a juicy target.

There are many more interesting elements that deserve more attention paid to them — new protocols, new hardware/software models, new operational ramifications…and I’m going to do just that.

If you’re a vendor who cares to share what you’re doing to secure your SDN offerings — and I promise I’ll be fair and balanced as I always am — please feel free to reach out to me.  If you don’t and I choose to include your solution based on access to what data I have, you run the risk of being painted inaccurately <hint>

If you have any ideas, comments or suggestions on what you’d like to see featured or excluded, let me know.  This will be along the lines of what I did with the “Four Horsemen Of the Virtualization Security Apocalypse” back in 2008.

Check out a couple of previous ramblings related to SDN (and OpenFlow) with respect to security below.


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Back To The Future: Network Segmentation & More Moaning About Zoning

July 16th, 2012 5 comments

A Bit Of Context…

This image was selected as a picture of the we...

(Photo credit: Wikipedia)A Bit Of Context…

The last 3 years have been very interesting when engaging with large enterprises and service providers as they set about designing, selecting and deploying their “next generation” network architecture. These new networks are deployed in timescales that see them collide with disruptive innovation such as fabrics, cloud, big data and DevOps.

In most cases, these network platforms must account for the nuanced impact of virtualized design patterns, refreshes of programmatic architecture and languages, and the operational model differences these things introduce.  What’s often apparent is that no matter how diligent the review, by the time these platforms are chosen, many tradeoffs are made — especially when it comes to security and compliance — and we arrive at the old adage: “You can get fast, cheap or secure…pick two.”

…And In the Beginning, There Was Spanning Tree…

The juxtaposition of flatter and flatter physical networks, nee “fabrics” (compute, network and storage,) with what seems to be a flip-flop transition between belief systems and architects who push for either layer 2 or layer 3 (or encapsulated versions thereof) segmentation at the higher layers is again aggravated by continued push for security boundary definition that yields further segmentation based on policy at the application and information layer.

So what we end up with is the benefits of flatter, any-to-any connectivity at the physical networking layer with a “software defined” and virtualized networking context floating both alongside (Nicira, BigSwitch, OpenFlow) as well as atop it (VMware, Citrix, OpenStack Quantum, etc.) with a bunch of protocols ladled on like some protocol gravy blanketing the Chicken Fried Steak that represents the modern data center.

Oh!  You Mean the Cloud…

Now, there are many folks who don’t approach it this way, and instead abstract away much of what I just described.  In Amazon Web Services’ case as a service provider, they dumb down the network sufficiently and control the abstracted infrastructure to the point that “flatness” is the only thing customers get and if you’re going to run your applications atop, you must keep it simple and programmatic in nature else risk introducing unnecessary complexity into the “software stack.”

The customers who then depend upon these simplified networking services must then absorb the gaps introduced by a lack of features by architecturally engineering around them, becoming more automated, instrumented and programmatic in nature or add yet another layer of virtualized (and generally encrypted) transport and execution above them.

This works if you’re able to engineer your way around these gaps (or make them less relevant,) but generally this is where segmentation becomes an issue due to security and compliance design patterns which depend on the “complexity” introduced by the very flexible networking constructs available in most enterprise of SP networks.

It’s like a layered cake that keeps self-frosting.

Software Defined Architecture…

You can see the extreme opportunity for Software Defined *anything* then, can’t you? With SDN, let the physical networks NOT be complex but rather more simple and flat and then unify the orchestration, traffic steering, service insertion and (even) security capabilities of the physical and virtual networks AND the virtualization/cloud orchestration layers (from the networking perspective) into a single intelligent control plane…

That’s a big old self-frosting cake.

Basically, this is what AWS has done…but all that intelligence provided by the single pane of glass is currently left up to the app owner atop them.  That’s the downside.  Those sufficiently enlightened AWS’ customers are aware generally  of this and understand the balance of benefits and limitations of this path.

In an enterprise environment, however, it’s a timing game between the controller vendors, the virtualization/cloud stack providers, the networking vendors, and security vendors …each trying to offer up this capability either as an “integrated” capability or as an overlay…all under the watchful eye of the auditor who is generally unmotivated, uneducated and unnerved by all this new technology — especially since the compliance frameworks and regulatory elements aren’t designed to account for these dramatic shifts in architecture or operation (let alone the threat curve of advanced adversaries.)

Back To The Future…Hey, Look, It’s Token Ring and DMZs!

As I sit with these customers who build these nextgen networks, the moment segmentation comes up, the elegant network and application architectures rapidly crumble into piles of asset-based rubble as what happens next borders on the criminal…

Thanks to compliance initiatives — PCI is a good example — no matter how well scoped, those flat networks become more and more logically hierarchical.  Because SDN is still nascent and we’re lacking that unified virtualized network (and security) control plane, we end up resorting back to platform-specific “less flat” network architectures in both the physical and virtual layers to achieve “enclave” like segmentation.

But with virtualization the problem gets more complex as in an attempt to be agile, cost efficient and in order to bring data to the workloads to reduce heaving lifting of the opposite approach, out-of-scope assets can often (and suddenly) be co-resident with in-scope assets…traversing logical and physical constructs that makes it much more difficult to threat model since the level of virtualized context supports differs wildly across these layers.

Architects are then left to think how they can effectively take all the awesome performance, agility, scale and simplicity offered by the underlying fabrics (compute, network and storage) and then layer on — bolt on — security and compliance capabilities.

What they discover is that it’s very, very, very platform specific…which is why we see protocols such as VXLAN and NVGRE pop up to deal with them.

Lego Blocks and Pig Farms…

These architects then replicate the design patterns with which they are familiar and start to craft DMZs that are logically segmented in the physical network and then grafted on to the virtual.  So we end up with relying on what Gunnar Petersen and I refer to as the “SSL and Firewall” lego block…we front end collections of “layer 2 connected” assets based on criticality or function, many of which stretched across these fabrics, and locate them behind layer 3 “firewalls” which provide basic zone-based isolation and often VPN connectivity between “trusted” groups of other assets.

In short, rather than build applications that securely authenticate, communicate — or worse yet, even when they do — we pigpen our corralled assets and make our estate fatter instead of flatter.  It’s really a shame.

I’ve made the case in my “Commode Computing” presentation that one of the very first things that architects need to embrace is the following:

…by not artificially constraining the way in which we organize, segment and apply policy (i.e. “put it in a DMZ”) we can think about how design “anti-patterns” may actually benefit us…you can call them what you like, but we need to employ better methodology for “zoning.”

These trust zones or enclaves are reasonable in concept so long as we can ultimately further abstract their “segmentation” and abstract the security and compliance policy requirements by expressing policy programmatically and taking the logical business and functional use-case PROCESSES into consideration when defining, expressing and instantiating said policy.

You know…understand what talks to what and why…

A great way to think about this problem is to apply the notion of application mobility — without VM containers — and how one would instantiate a security “policy” in that context.  In many cases, as we march up the stack to distributed platform application architectures, we’re not able to depend upon the “crutch” that hypervisors or VM packages have begun to give us in legacy architectures that have virtualization grafted onto them.

Since many enterprises are now just starting to better leverage their virtualized infrastructure, there *are* some good solutions (again, platform specific) that unify the physical and virtual networks from a zoning perspective, but the all-up process-driven, asset-centric (app & information) view of “policy” is still woefully lacking, especially in heterogeneous environments.

Wrapping Up…

In enterprise and SP environments where we don’t have the opportunity to start anew, it often feels like we’re so far off from this sort of capability because it requires a shift that makes software defined networking look like child’s play.  Most enterprises don’t do risk-driven, asset-centric, process-mapped modelling, [and SP's are disconnected from this,] so segmentation falls back to what we know: DMZs with VLANs, NAT, Firewalls, SSL and new protocol band-aids invented to cover gaping arterial wounds.

In environments lucky enough to think about and match the application use cases with the highly-differentiated operational models that virtualized *everything* brings to bear, it’s here today — but be prepared and honest that the vendor(s) you chose must be strategic and the interfaces between those platforms and external entities VERY well defined…else you risk software defined entropy.

I wish I had more than the 5 minutes it took to scratch this out because there’s SO much to talk about here…

…perhaps later.

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QuickQuip: “Networking Doesn’t Need a VMWare” < tl;dr

January 10th, 2012 1 comment

I admit I was enticed by the title of the blog and the introductory paragraph certainly reeled me in with the author creds:

This post was written with Andrew Lambeth.  Andrew has been virtualizing networking for long enough to have coined the term “vswitch”, and led the vDS distributed switching project at VMware

I can only assume that this is the same Andrew Lambeth who is currently employed at Nicira.  I had high expectations given the title,  so I sat down, strapped in and prepared for a fire hose.

Boy did I get one…

27 paragraphs amounting to 1,601 words worth that basically concluded that server virtualization is not the same thing as network virtualization, stateful L2 & L3 network virtualization at scale is difficult and ultimately virtualizing the data plane is the easy part while the hard part of getting the mackerel out of the tin is virtualizing the control plane – statefully.*

*[These are clearly *my* words as the only thing fishy here was the conclusion...]

It seems the main point here, besides that mentioned above, is to stealthily and diligently distance Nicira as far from the description of “…could be to networking something like what VMWare was to computer servers” as possible.

This is interesting given that this is how they were described in a NY Times blog some months ago.  Indeed, this is exactly the description I could have sworn *used* to appear on Nicira’s own about page…it certainly shows up in Google searches of their partners o_O

In his last section titled “This is all interesting … but why do I care?,” I had selfishly hoped for that very answer.

Sadly, at the end of the day, Lambeth’s potentially excellent post appears more concerned about culling marketing terms than hammering home an important engineering nuance:

Perhaps the confusion is harmless, but it does seem to effect how the solution space is viewed, and that may be drawing the conversation away from what really is important, scale (lots of it) and distributed state consistency. Worrying about the datapath , is worrying about a trivial component of an otherwise enormously challenging problem

This smacks of positioning against both OpenFlow (addressed here) as well as other network virtualization startups.


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Stuff I’ve Really Wanted To Blog About But Haven’t Had the Time…

December 13th, 2011 1 comment

This is more a post-it note to the Universe simultaneously admitting both blogging bankruptcy as well as my intention to circle back to these reminders and write the damned things:

  1. @embrane launches out of stealth and @ioshints, @etherealmind and @bradhedlund all provide very interesting perspectives on the value proposition of Heleos – their network service virtualization solution. One thing emerges: SDN is the next vocabulary battleground after Cloud and Big Data
  2. With the unintentional assistance of @swardley who warned me about diffusion S-curves and evolution vs. revolution, I announce my plan to launch a new security presentation series around the juxtaposition and overlay of Metcalfe’s + HD Moore’s + (Gordon) Moore’s+ (Geoffrey) Moore’s Laws. I call it the “Composite Calculus of Cloud Computing Causality.”  I’m supposed to add something about Everett Rogers.
  3. Paul Kedrosky posts an interesting graphic reflecting a Gartner/UBS study on cloud revenues through 2015. Interesting on many fronts:
  4. Ah, FedRAMP. I’ve written about it here. @danphilpott does his usual bang-on job summarizing what it means — and what it doesn’t in “New FedRAMP Program: Not Half-Baked but Not Cooked Through”
  5. This Layer7-supplied @owasp presentation by Adam Vincent on Web Services Hacking and Hardening is a good basic introduction to such (PDF.)
  6. via @hrbrmstr, Dan Geer recommends “America the Vulnerable” from Joel Brenner on “the next great battleground; Digital Security.” Good read.
  7. I didn’t know this: @ioshints blogs about the (Cisco) Nexus 1000V and vMotion  Sad summary: you cannot vMotion across two vDS (and thus two NX1KV domains/VSMs).
  8. The AWS patchocalypse causes galactic panic as they issue warnings and schedules associated with the need to reboot images due to an issue that required remediation.  Funny because of how much attention needing to patch a platform can bring when people set their expectations that it won’t happen (or need to.)  Can’t patch that… ;(
  9. @appirio tries to make me look like a schmuck in the guise of a “publicly nominated award for worst individual cloudwasher.” This little gimmick backfires when the Twitterverse exploits holes in the logic of their polling engine they selected and I got over 800,000 votes for first place over Larry Ellison and Steve Ballmer.  Vote for Pedro

More shortly as I compile my list.

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The Killer App For OpenFlow and SDN? Security.

October 27th, 2011 8 comments

I spent yesterday at the PacketPushers/TechFieldDay OpenFlow Symposium. The event provided a good overview of what OpenFlow [currently] means, how it fits into the overall context of software-defined networking (SDN) and where it might go from here.

I’d suggest reading Ethan Banks’ (@ecbanks) overview here.

Many of us left the event, however, still wondering about what the “killer app” for OpenFlow might be.

Chatting with Ivan Pepelnjak (@ioshints) and Derrick Winkworth (@CloudToad,) I reiterated that selfishly, I’m still thrilled about the potential that OpenFlow and SDN can bring to security.  This was a topic only briefly skirted during the symposium as the ACL-like capabilities of OpenFlow were discussed, but there’s so much more here.

I wrote about this back in May (OpenFlow & SDN – Looking forward to SDNS: Software Defined Network Security):

… “security” needs to be as programmatic/programmable, agile, scaleable and flexible as the workloads (and stacks) it is designed to protect. “Security” in this context extends well beyond the network, but the network provides such a convenient way of defining templated containers against which we can construct and enforce policies across a wide variety of deployment and delivery models.

So as I watch OpenFlow (and Software Defined Networking) mature, I’m really, really excited to recognize the potential for a slew of innovative ways we can leverage and extend this approach to networking [monitoring and enforcement] in order to achieve greater visibility, scale, agility, performance, efficacy and reduced costs associated with security.  The more programmatic and instrumented the network becomes, the more capable our security options will become also.

I had to chuckle at a serendipitous tweet from a former Cisco co-worker (Stefan Avgoustakis, @savgoust) because it’s really quite apropos for this topic:

…I think he’s oddly right!

Frankly, if you look at what OpenFlow and SDN (and network programmability in general) gives an operator — the visibility and effective graph of connectivity as well as the multiple-tupule flow action capabilities, there are numerous opportunities to leverage the separation of control/data plane across both virtual and physical networks to provide better security capabilities in response to threats and at a pace/scale/radius commensurate with said threat.

To be able to leverage telemetry and flow tables in the controllers “centrally” and then “dispatch” the necessary security response on an as-needed basis to the network location ONLY that needs it, really does start to sound a lot like the old “immune system” analogy that SDN (self defending networks) promised.

The ability to distribute security capabilities more intelligently as a service layer which can be effected when needed — without the heavy shotgunned footprint of physical in-line devices or the sprawl of virtualized appliances — is truly attractive.  Automation for detection and ultimately prevention is FTW.

Bundling the capabilities delivered via programmatic interfaces and coupling that with ways of integrating the “network” and “applications” (of which security is one) produces some really neat opportunities.

Now, this isn’t just a classical “data center core” opportunity, either. How about the WAN/Edge?  Campus, branch…? Anywhere you have the need to deliver security as a service.

For non-security examples, check out Dave Ward’s (my Juniper colleague) presentation “Programmable Networks are SFW” where he details interesting use cases such as “service engineered paths,” “service appliance pooling,” “service specific topology,” “content request routing,” and “bandwidth calendaring” for example.

…think of the security ramifications and opportunities linked to those capabilities!

I’ve mocked up a couple of very interesting security prototypes using OpenFlow and some open source security components; from IDP to Anti-malware and the potential is exciting because OpenFlow — in conjunction with other protocols and solutions in the security ecosystem — could provide some of the missing glue necessary to deliver a constant,  but abstracted security command/control (nee API-like capability) across heterogenous infrastructure.

NOTE: I’m not suggesting that OpenFlow itself provide these security capabilities, but rather enable security solutions to take advantage of the control/data plane separation to provide for more agile and effective security.

If the potential exists for OpenFlow to effectively allow choice of packet forwarding engines and network virtualization across the spectrum of supporting vendors’ switches, it occurs to me that we could utilize it for firewalls, intrusion detection/prevention engines, WAFs, NAC, etc.


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OpenFlow & SDN – Looking forward to SDNS: Software Defined Network Security

April 8th, 2011 3 comments

As facetious as the introductory premise of my Commode Computing presentation is, the main message — the automation of security capabilities up and down the stack — really is something I’m passionate about.

Ultimately, I made the point that “security” needs to be as programmatic/programmable, agile, scaleable and flexible as the workloads (and stacks) it is designed to protect. “Security” in this contexts extends well beyond the network, but the network provides such a convenient way of defining templated containers against which we can construct and enforce policies across a wide variety of deployment and delivery models.

So as I watch OpenFlow (and Software Defined Networking) mature, I’m really, really excited to recognize the potential for a slew of innovative ways we can leverage and extend this approach to networking [monitoring and enforcement] in order to achieve greater visibility, scale, agility, performance, efficacy and reduced costs associated with security.  The more programmatic and instrumented the network becomes, the more capable our security options will become also.

I’m busy reading many of the research activities associated with OpenFlow security and digesting where vendors are in terms of their approach to leveraging this technology in terms of security.  It may be just my perspective, but it’s a little sparse today — not disappointingly so — with a huge greenfield opportunity for really innovative stuff when paired with advancements we’re seeing in virtualization and cloud computing.

I’ll relate more of my thoughts and discoveries as time goes on.  If you’ve got some cool ideas/concepts/products in this area (I don’t care who you work for,) post ‘em here in the comments, please!

In the meantime, check out: to get your feet wet.


Reminders to self to perform more research on (I think I’m going to do my next presentation series on this):

  • AAA for messages between OpenFlow Switch and Controllers
  • Flood protection for controllers
  • Spoofing/MITM between switch/controllers (specifically SSL/TLS)
  • Flow-through (ha!)/support of OpenFlow in virtual switches (see 1000v and Open vSwitch)
  • (per above) Integration with VN-Tag (like) flow-VM (workload) tagging
  • Integration of Netflow data from OpenFlow flow tables
  • State/flow-table convergence for security decisions with/without cut-through given traffic steering
  • Service insertion overlays for security control planes
  • Integration with 802.1x (and protocol extensions such as TrustSec)
  • Telemetry integration with NAC and vNAC
  • Anti-DDoS implications
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