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Archive for August, 2012

SiliconAngle Cube: Hoff On Security – Live At VMworld 2012

August 31st, 2012 3 comments

I was thrilled to be invited back to the SiliconAngle Cube at VMworld 2012 where John Furrier, Dave Vellante and I spoke in depth about security, virtualization and software defined networking (SDN)

I really like the way the chat turned out — high octane, fast pace and some great questions!

Here is the amazing full list of speakers during the event.  Check it out, ESPECIALLY Martin Casado’s talk.

As I told him, I think he is like my Obi Wan…my only hope for convincing my friends at VMware that networking and security require more attention and a real embrace of the ecosystem…

I’d love to hear your feedback on the video.

/Hoff

 

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Software Defined Networking (In)Security: All Your Control Plane Are Belong To Us…

August 20th, 2012 No comments

My next series of talks are focused around the emerging technology, solutions and security architectures of so-called “Software Defined Networking (SDN)”

As this space heats up, I see a huge opportunity for new and interesting ways in which security can be delivered — the killer app? — but I also am concerned that, per usual, security is a potential after thought.

At an absolute minimum example, the separation of control and data planes (much as what we saw with compute-centric virtualization) means we now have additional (or at least bifurcated) attack surfaces and threat vectors.  And not unlike compute-centric virtualization, the C&C channels for network operation represents a juicy target.

There are many more interesting elements that deserve more attention paid to them — new protocols, new hardware/software models, new operational ramifications…and I’m going to do just that.

If you’re a vendor who cares to share what you’re doing to secure your SDN offerings — and I promise I’ll be fair and balanced as I always am — please feel free to reach out to me.  If you don’t and I choose to include your solution based on access to what data I have, you run the risk of being painted inaccurately <hint>

If you have any ideas, comments or suggestions on what you’d like to see featured or excluded, let me know.  This will be along the lines of what I did with the “Four Horsemen Of the Virtualization Security Apocalypse” back in 2008.

Check out a couple of previous ramblings related to SDN (and OpenFlow) with respect to security below.

/Hoff

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Incomplete Thought: Virtual/Cloud Security and The Potemkin Village Syndrome

August 16th, 2012 3 comments

Portrait of russian fieldmarshal Prince Potemk...A “Potemkin village” is a Russian expression derived from folklore from the 1700′s.  The story goes something like this: Grigory Potemkin, a military leader and  statesman, erected attractive but completely fake settlements constructed only of facades to impress Catherine the Great (empress of Russia) during a state visit in order to gain favor and otherwise hype the value of recently subjugated territories.

I’ll get to that (and probably irate comments from actual Russians who will chide me for my hatchet job on their culture…)

Innovation over the last decade in technology in general has brought fundamental shifts in the way in which we work, live, and play. In the last 4 years, the manner in which technology products and services that enabled by this “digital supply chain,” and the manner in which they are designed, built and brought to market have also pivoted.

Virtualization and Cloud computing — the technologies and operational models — have contributed greatly to this.

Interestingly enough, the faster technology evolves, the more lethargic, fragile and fractured security seems to be.

This can be explained in a few ways.

First, the trust models, architecture and operational models surrounding how we’ve “done” security simply are not designed to absorb this much disruption so quickly.  The fact that we’ve relied on physical segregation, static policies that combine locality and service definition, mobility and the (now) highly dynamic application deployment options means that we’re simply disconnected.

Secondly, fragmentation and specialization within security means that we have no cohesive, integrated or consistent approach in terms of how we define or instantiate “security,” and so customers are left to integrate disparate solutions at multiple layers (think physical and/or virtual firewalls, IDP, DLP, WAF, AppSec, etc.)  What services and “hooks” the operating systems, networks and provisioning/orchestration layers offers largely dictates what we can do using the skills and “best practices” we already have.

Lastly, the (un)natural market consolidation behavior wherein aspiring technology startups are acquired and absorbed into larger behemoth organizations means that innovation cycles in security quickly become victims of stunted periodicity, reduced focus on solving specific problems, cultural subduction and artificially constrained scope based on P&L models which are detached from reality, customers and out of step with trends that end up driving more disruption.

I’ve talked about this process as part of the “Security Hamster Sine Wave of Pain.”  It’s not a malicious or evil plan on behalf of vendors to conspire to not solve your problems, it’s an artifact of the way in which the market functions — and is allowed to function.

What this yields is that when new threat models, evolving vulnerabilities and advanced adversarial skill sets are paired with massively disruptive approaches and technology “conquests,” the security industry  basically erects facades of solutions, obscuring the fact that in many cases, there’s not only a lacking foundation for the house of cards we’ve built, but interestingly there’s not much more to it than that.

Again, this isn’t a plan masterminded by a consortium of industry “Dr. Evils.”  Actually, it’s quite simple: It’s inertial…if you keep buying it, they’ll keep making it.

We are suffering then from the security equivalent of the Potemkin Village syndrome; our efforts are largely built to impress people who are mesmerized by pretty facades but don’t take the time to recognize that there’s really nothing there.  Those building it, while complicit, find it quite hard to change.

Until the revolution comes.

To wit, we have hardworking members of the proletariat, toiling away behind the scenes struggling to add substance and drive change in the way in which we do what we do.

Adding to this is the good news that those two aforementioned “movements” — virtualization and cloud computing — are exposing the facades for what they are and we’re now busy shining the light on unstable foundations, knocking over walls and starting to build platforms that are fundamentally better suited to support security capabilities rather than simply “patching holes.”

Most virtualization and IaaS cloud platforms are still woefully lacking the native capabilities or interfaces to build security in, but that’s the beauty of platforms (as a service,) as you can encourage more “universally” the focus on the things that matter most: building resilient and survivable systems, deploying secure applications, and identifying and protecting information across its lifecycle.

Realistically this is a long view and it is going to take a few more cycles on the Hamster Wheel to drive true results.  It’s frankly less about technology and rather largely a generational concern with the current ruling party who governs operational security awaiting deposition, retirement or beheading.

I’m looking forward to more disruption, innovation and reconstruction.  Let’s fix the foundation and deal with hanging pictures later.  Redecorating security is for the birds…or dead Russian royalty.

/Hoff

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The Soylent Green of “Epic Hacks” – It’s Made of PEOPLE!

August 7th, 2012 3 comments

Allow me to immediately state that I am, in no way, attempting to blame or shame the victim in my editorial below.

However, the recent rash of commentary from security wonks on Twitter and blogs regarding who is to “blame” in Mat Honan’s unfortunate experience leaves me confused and misses an important point.

Firstly, the title of the oft-referenced article documenting the series of events is at the root of my discontent:

How Apple and Amazon Security Flaws Led to My Epic Hacking

As I tweeted, my assessment and suggestion for a title would be:

How my poor behavior led to my epic hacking & flawed trust models & bad luck w/Apple and Amazon assisted

…especially when coupled with what is clearly an admission by Mr. Honan, that he is, fundamentally, responsible for enabling the chained series of events that took place:

In the space of one hour, my entire digital life was destroyed. First my Google account was taken over, then deleted. Next my Twitter account was compromised, and used as a platform to broadcast racist and homophobic messages. And worst of all, my AppleID account was broken into, and my hackers used it to remotely erase all of the data on my iPhone, iPad, and MacBook.

In many ways, this was all my fault. My accounts were daisy-chained together. Getting into Amazon let my hackers get into my Apple ID account, which helped them get into Gmail, which gave them access to Twitter. Had I used two-factor authentication for my Google account, it’s possible that none of this would have happened, because their ultimate goal was always to take over my Twitter account and wreak havoc. Lulz.

Had I been regularly backing up the data on my MacBook, I wouldn’t have had to worry about losing more than a year’s worth of photos, covering the entire lifespan of my daughter, or documents and e-mails that I had stored in no other location.

Those security lapses are my fault, and I deeply, deeply regret them.

The important highlighted snippets above are obscured by the salacious title and the bulk of the article which focuses on how services — which he enabled and relied upon — however flawed certain components of that trust and process may have been, are *really* at the center of the debate here.  Or ought to be.

There’s clearly a bit of emotional transference occurring.  It’s easier to associate causality with a faceless big corporate machine rather than swing the light toward the victim, even if he, himself, self-identifies.

Before you think I’m madly defending and/or suggesting that there weren’t breakdowns with any of the vendors — especially Apple — let me assure you I am not.  There are many things that can and should be addressed here, but leaving out the human element, the root of it all here, is dangerous.

I am concerned that as a community there is often an aire of suggestion that consumers are incapable and inculpable with respect to understanding the risks associated with the clicky-clicky-connect syndrome that all of these interconnected services brings.

People give third party applications and services unfettered access to services like Twitter and Facebook every day — even when messages surrounding the potential incursion of privacy and security are clearly stated.

When something does fail — and it does and always will — we vilify the suppliers (sometimes rightfully so for poor practices) but we never really look at what we need to do to prevent having to see this again: “Those security lapses are my fault, and I deeply, deeply regret them.”

The more interconnected things become, the more dependent upon flawed trust models and the expectations that users aren’t responsible we shall be.

This is the point I made in my presentations: Cloudifornication and Cloudinomicon.

There’s a lot of interesting discussion regarding the effectiveness of security awareness training.  Dave Aitel started a lively one here: “Why you shouldn’t train employees for security awareness

It’s unfortunate the the only real way people learn is through misfortune, and any way you look at it, that’s the thing that drives awareness.

There are many lessons we can learn from Mr. Honan’s unfortunate experience…I urge you to consider less focusing blame on one link in the chain and instead guide the people you can influence to reconsider decisions of convenience over the potential tradeoffs they incur.

/Hoff

P.S. For you youngsters who don’t get the Soylent Green reference, see here.  Better yet, watch it. It’s awesome. Charlton Heston, FTW.

P.P.S. (Check out the sentiment of all the articles below)

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