Archive for the ‘Uncategorized’ Category

Dear SaaS Vendors: If Cloud Is The Way Forward & Companies Shouldn’t Spend $ On Privately-Operated Infrastructure, When Are You Moving Yours To Amazon Web Services?

April 30th, 2010 6 comments

We’re told repetitively by Software as a Service (SaaS)* vendors that infrastructure is irrelevant, that CapEx spending is for fools and that Cloud Computing has fundamentally changed the way we will, forever, consume computing resources.

Why is it then that many of the largest SaaS providers on the planet (including firms like, Twitter, Facebook, etc.) continue to build their software and choose to run it in their own datacenters on their own infrastructure?  In fact, many of them are on a tear involving multi-hundred million dollar (read: infrastructure) private datacenter build-outs.

I mean, SaaS is all about the software and service delivery, right?  IaaS/PaaS is the perfect vehicle for the delivery of scaleable software, right?  So why do you continue to try to convince *us* to move our software to you and yet *you* don’t/won’t/can’t move your software to someone else like AWS?

Hypocricloud: SaaS firms telling us we’re backwards for investing in infrastructure when they don’t eat the dog food they’re dispensing (AKA we’ll build private clouds and operate them, but tell you they’re a bad idea, in order to provide public cloud offerings to you…)

Quid pro quo, agent Starling.


* I originally addressed this to via Twitter in response to Peter Coffee’s blog here but repurposed the title to apply to SaaS vendors in general.

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Virtual Networking/Nexus 1000v Virtual Switch Blogger Roundtable/WebEx Logistics – March 2nd.

February 25th, 2010 3 comments

About a year before I started working at the Jolly Green Giant (Cisco) I had a rather loud and addictive hobby that was focused on proving that Cisco would offer a “third party” virtual switch for VMware environments.  This sort of unhealthy fascination also dovetailed with another related to “Project California” which later became the UCS (Unified Computing System.)  Both are now something I talk about in my day job quite a bit.

So I don’t normally directly blog about specific work-related stuff here, but I’m going to make a quasi-exception.

The PM’s from our SAVBU (Server and Virtualization Business Unit) who own the Nexus 1000v and UCS product lines asked me if I’d get together a bunch of bloggers, analysts, end users, pundits, crusaders, super heroes, networking and security geeks and have a discussion about virtual networking — specifically the 1000v.

Of course they ask me to do this on the first day of the RSA Security Conference. At 9am. In the morning. Nice.

They didn’t tell me what they wanted me to say because honestly I think they want to see just how flustered the group above can get me…

So here’s the addy to the WebEx:

The event starts at 9am PST and I’ve got a room that can hold 8 people physically (or so I’m told) in our building across the street from Moscone at 201 3rd Street, San Francisco.  If you plan to attend physically, the first 8 folks can meet me downstairs at the Chevy’s Mexican restaurant and we’ll go up at 8:30 SHARP.  Otherwise, dial-in and have a good time.

It’s scheduled for an hour.

Talk/see you then.  With the folks that have already said they’d participate, it ought to be fun.  No, you don’t have to be a fanboy.


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“Vint & Me” – Kickin’ Butt & Takin’ Names (Unfortunately Mine…)

January 21st, 2010 4 comments

I think perhaps my choice of words were met with an unfortunate style of punctuation I was not expecting…

The Internet — once again kicking security’s ass, Karate Kid style, no less…

It seems I’m going to have to sharpen my mad skills, as the previous two meetings have led to similar results:


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Really Interesting Crap In My Browser Tabs: Poor Man’s

September 29th, 2009 5 comments

I usually keep 40-50 tabs open in my browser for review when I find things worthy of review. What usually happens is the damn thing memory leaks, implodes and I lose a bunch of good stuff.  Here’s my uber-optimized and virtualized solution to this problem.  Post ’em here:

There’s more, but this is a good list.


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Incomplete Thought: Virtual Machines Are the Problem, Not the Solution…

September 25th, 2009 40 comments

simplicity_complexityI’m an infrastructure guy. A couple of days ago I had a lightbulb go on.  If you’re an Apps person, you’ve likely already had your share of illumination.  I’ve just never thought about things from this perspective.  Please don’t think any less of me 😉

You can bet I’m talking above my pay grade here, but bear with my ramblings for a minute and help me work through this (Update: I’m very happy to see that Surendra Reddy [@sureddy – follow him] did just that with his excellent post – cross-posted in the comments below, here. Also, check out Simon Crosby’s (Citrix CTO) post “Wither the venerable OS“)

It comes down to this:

Virtual machines (VMs) represent the symptoms of a set of legacy problems packaged up to provide a placebo effect as an answer that in some cases we have, until lately, appeared disinclined and not technologically empowered to solve.

If I had a wish, it would be that VM’s end up being the short-term gap-filler they deserve to be and ultimately become a legacy technology so we can solve some of our real architectural issues the way they ought to be solved.

That said, please don’t get me wrong, VMs have allowed us to take the first steps toward defining, compartmentalizing, and isolating some pretty nasty problems anchored on the sins of our fathers, but they don’t do a damned thing to fix them.

VMs have certainly allowed us to (literally) “think outside the box” about how we characterize “workloads” and have enabled us to begin talking about how we make them somewhat mobile, portable, interoperable, easy to describe, inventory and in some cases more secure. Cool.

There’s still a pile of crap inside ’em.

What do I mean?

There’s a bloated, parasitic resource-gobbling cancer inside every VM.  For the most part, it’s the real reason we even have mass market virtualization today.

It’s called the operating system:


If we didn’t have resource-inefficient operating systems, handicapped applications that were incestuously hooked to them, and tons of legacy networking stuff to deal with that unholy affinity, imagine the fun we could have.  Imagine how agile and flexible we could become.

But wait, isn’t server virtualization the answer to that?

Not really.  Server virtualization like that pictured in the diagram above is just the first stake we’re going to drive into the heart of the frankenmonster that is the OS.  The OS is like Cousin Eddie and his RV.

The approach we’ve taken today is that the VMM/Hypervisor abstracts the hardware from the OS.  The applications are still stuck on top of operating systems that don’t provide much in the way of any benefit given the emergence of development frameworks/languages such as J2EE, PHP, Ruby, .NET, etc. that were built around the notions of decoupled, distributed and mashable application “fabrics.”

Every ship travels with an anchor, in the case of the VM it’s the OS.

Imagine if these applications didn’t have to worry about the resource-hogging, control-freak, I/O limiting, protected mode schizophrenia and de-privileged ring spoofing of hypervisors associated with trying not conflict with or offend the OS’s sacred relationship with the hardware beneath it.

Imagine if these application constructs were instead distributed programmatically, could intercommunicate using secure protocols and didn’t have to deal with legacy problems. Imagine if the VMM/Hypervisor really was there to enable scale, isolation, security, and management.  We’d be getting rid of an entire layer.

If that crap in the middle of the sandwich makes for inefficiency, insecurity and added cost in virtualized enterprises, imagine what it does at the Infrastructure as a Service (IaaS) layer in Cloud deployments where VMs — in whatever form — are the basis for the operational models.  We have these fat packaged VMs with OS overhead and attack surfaces that really don’t need to be there.

For example, most of the pre-packaged AMIs found on AWS are bloated general purpose operating systems with some hardening applied (if at all) but there’s just all that code… sitting there…doing nothing except taking up storage, memory and compute resources.

Why do we need this?   Why don’t we at at least see more of a push towards JEOS (Just Enough OS) in the meantime?

I think most virtualization vendors today who are moving their virtualization offerings to adapt to Cloud, are asking themselves the same questions and answering them by realizing that the real win in the long term — once enterprises are done with consolidation and virtualization and hit the next “enterprise application modernization” cycle — will be  to develop and engineer applications directly around platforms which obviate the OS.

So these virtualization players are  making acquisitions to prepare them for this next wave — the real emergence of Platform as a Service (PaaS.)

Some like Microsoft with Azure are simply starting there.  Even SaaS vendors have gone down-stack and provided PaaS offerings to further allow for connectivity, integration and security in the place they think it belongs.

In the case of VMware and their acquisition of SpringSource, that piece of bloat in the middle can be seen as simply going away; whatever you call it, it’s about disintermediating the OS completely and it seems to me that the entire notion of vApps addresses this very thing.  I’m sure there are a ton of other offerings that I simply didn’t get before that are going to make me go “AHA!” now.

I’m not sure organizationally or operationally that most enterprises can get their arms around what it means to not have that OS layer in the middle in the short term, but this new platform-oriented Cloud is really interesting.  It makes those folks who may have made the conversion from server-hugger to VM-hugger and think they were done adapting, quite uncomfortable.

It makes me uncomfortable…and giddy.

All the things I know and understand about how things at the Infrastructure layer s interacts with applications and workloads at the Infostructure layer will drastically change.  The security models will change.  The solutions will change.  Even the notion of vMotion — moving VM’s around — will change.  In fact, in this model, vMotion isn’t really relevant.

Admittedly, I’ve had to call into question over the last few days just how relevant the notion of “Infrastructure 2.0” is within this model — at least how it’s described today.

Cloud v1.0 with all it’s froth and hype is going to be nothing compared to Cloud 2.0 — the revenge of SOA, web services, BPM, enterprise architecture and the developer.  Luckily for the sake of us infrastructure folks we still have time to catch up and see the light as the VMM buys us visibility and a management plane.  However, the protocols and models for how applications interact with the network are sure going to change and accelerate due to Cloud — at least they should.

Just look at how developments such as XMPP and LISP are going to play in a PaaS-centric world…

Like I said, it’s an incomplete thought and I’m not enlightened enough to frame a better discussion in written form, but I can’t wait until the next Infrastructure 2.0 Working Group to bring this up.

I have an appreciation for such a bigger piece of the conversation now.  I just need to get more edumacated.

My head ahsplodes.

Any of this crap make sense to you?


Who Knows What He Is Talking About?

August 2nd, 2009 1 comment

From Indexed “Who knows what he is talking about?

So, which are you?

So, which are you?

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Extending the Concept: A Security API for Cloud Stacks

July 24th, 2009 7 comments

Please See the follow-on to this post:

Update: Wow, did this ever stir up an amazing set of commentary on Twitter. No hash tag, unfortunately, but comments from all angles.  Most of the SecTwits dropped into “fire in the hole” mode, but it’s understandable.  Thank you @rybolov (who was there when I presented this to the gub’mint and @shrdlu who was the voice of, gulp, reason 😉

The Audit, Assertion, Assessment, and Assurance API (A6) (Title credited to @CSOAndy)

It started innocently enough with a post I made on the crushing weight of companies executing “right to audit clauses” in their contracts.  Craig Balding followed that one up with an excellent post of his own.

This lead to Craig’s excellent idea around solving a problem related to not being able to perform network-based vulnerability scans of Cloud-hosted infrastructure due to contractual and technical concerns related to multi-tenancy.  Specifically, Craig lobbied to create an open standard for vulnerability scanning API’s (an example I’ve been using in my talks for quite some time to illustrate challenges in ToS, for example.)  It’s an excellent idea.

So I propose — as I did to a group of concerned government organizations yesterday — that we take this concept a step further, beyond just “vulnerability scanning.”

Let’s solve BOTH of the challenges above with one solution.

Specifically, let’s take the capabilities of something like SCAP and embed a standardized and open API layer into each IaaS, PaaS and SaaS offering (see the API blocks in the diagram below) to provide not only a standardized way of scanning for network vulnerabilities, but also configuration management, asset management, patch remediation, compliance, etc.

Further (HT to @davidoberry who reminded me about my posts on the topic) we could use TCG IF-MAP as a comms. protocol for telemetry.


This way you win two ways: automated audit and security management capability for the customer/consumer and a a streamlined, cost effective, and responsive way of automating the validation of said controls in relation to compliance, SLA and legal requirements for service providers.

Since we just saw a story today titled “Feds May Come Up With Cloud Security Standards” — why not use one they already have in SCAP to suggest we leverage it to get even better bang for the buck from a security perspective.  This concept extends well beyond the Public sector and it doesn’t have to be SCAP, but it seems like a good example.

Of course we would engineer in authentication/authorization to interface via the APIs and then you could essentially get ISV’s who already support things like SCAP, etc. to provide the capability in their offerings — physical or virtual — to enable it.

We’re not reinventing the wheel and we have lots of technology and standardized solutions we can already use to engineer into the stack.

Whaddya thunk?


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Amazon and Zappos: The Cloud Clobbers Clog and Crocs Cobblers – Controversy Coming!

July 23rd, 2009 2 comments

I have been mortified with the titles of many blogs/articles this week relating the strangest and most sensational orthogonal topics in regards to Cloud.

My favorite:

Will the Kindle Krisis Kill Cloud Computing

I decided that in a last-ditch effort to drive sagging readership I would submit a this one:

  • Amazon – Sole Crushing Corporate Cloud Clobbers Cool Cobbler Company

That’s right!  It’s a Cloudastrophe: Amazon (AmaZappos?) actually owns your shoes and will steal them off your feet.

Ultimately I think that Zappos acquisition was a strategic goldmine for Amazon because clearly WhisperNet is the next generation upgrade to SneakerNet… <groan!>

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Cloud Computing [Security] Architectural Framework

July 19th, 2009 3 comments

CSA-LogoFor those of you who are not in the security space and may not have read the Cloud Security Alliance’s “Guidance for Critical Areas of Focus,” you may have missed the “Cloud Architectural Framework” section I wrote as a contribution.

We are working on improving the entire guide, but I thought I would re-publish the Cloud Architectural Framework section and solicit comments here as well as “set it free” as a stand-alone reference document.

Please keep in mind, I wrote this before many of the other papers such as NIST’s were officially published, so the normal churn in the blogosphere and general Cloud space may mean that  some of the terms and definitions have settled down.

I hope it proves useful, even in its current form (I have many updates to make as part of the v2 Guidance document.)


Problem Statement

Cloud Computing (“Cloud”) is a catch-all term that describes the evolutionary development of many existing technologies and approaches to computing that at its most basic, separates application and information resources from the underlying infrastructure and mechanisms used to deliver them with the addition of elastic scale and the utility model of allocation.  Cloud computing enhances collaboration, agility, scale, availability and provides the potential for cost reduction through optimized and efficient computing.

More specifically, Cloud describes the use of a collection of distributed services, applications, information and infrastructure comprised of pools of compute, network, information and storage resources.  These components can be rapidly orchestrated, provisioned, implemented and decommissioned using an on-demand utility-like model of allocation and consumption.  Cloud services are most often, but not always, utilized in conjunction with and enabled by virtualization technologies to provide dynamic integration, provisioning, orchestration, mobility and scale.

While the very definition of Cloud suggests the decoupling of resources from the physical affinity to and location of the infrastructure that delivers them, many descriptions of Cloud go to one extreme or another by either exaggerating or artificially limiting the many attributes of Cloud.  This is often purposely done in an attempt to inflate or marginalize its scope.  Some examples include the suggestions that for a service to be Cloud-based, that the Internet must be used as a transport, a web browser must be used as an access modality or that the resources are always shared in a multi-tenant environment outside of the “perimeter.”  What is missing in these definitions is context.

From an architectural perspective given this abstracted evolution of technology, there is much confusion surrounding how Cloud is both similar and differs from existing models and how these similarities and differences might impact the organizational, operational and technological approaches to Cloud adoption as it relates to traditional network and information security practices.  There are those who say Cloud is a novel sea-change and technical revolution while others suggest it is a natural evolution and coalescence of technology, economy, and culture.  The truth is somewhere in between.

There are many models available today which attempt to address Cloud from the perspective of academicians, architects, engineers, developers, managers and even consumers. We will focus on a model and methodology that is specifically tailored to the unique perspectives of IT network and security professionals.

The keys to understanding how Cloud architecture impacts security architecture are a common and concise lexicon coupled with a consistent taxonomy of offerings by which Cloud services and architecture can be deconstructed, mapped to a model of compensating security and operational controls, risk assessment and management frameworks and in turn, compliance standards.

Setting the Context: Cloud Computing Defined

Understanding how Cloud Computing architecture impacts security architecture requires an understanding of Cloud’s principal characteristics, the manner in which cloud providers deliver and deploy services, how they are consumed, and ultimately how they need to be safeguarded.

The scope of this area of focus is not to define the specific security benefits or challenges presented by Cloud Computing as these are covered in depth in the other 14 domains of concern:

  • Information lifecycle management
  • Governance and Enterprise Risk Management
  • Compliance & Audit
  • General Legal
  • eDiscovery
  • Encryption and Key Management
  • Identity and Access Management
  • Storage
  • Virtualization
  • Application Security
  • Portability & Interoperability
  • Data Center Operations Management
  • Incident Response, Notification, Remediation
  • “Traditional” Security impact (business continuity, disaster recovery, physical security)

We will discuss the various approaches and derivative offerings of Cloud and how they impact security from an architectural perspective using an in-process model developed as a community effort associated with the Cloud Security Alliance.

Principal Characteristics of Cloud Computing

Cloud services are based upon five principal characteristics that demonstrate their relation to, and differences from, traditional computing approaches:

  1. Abstraction of Infrastructure
    The compute, network and storage infrastructure resources are abstracted from the application and information resources as a function of service delivery. Where and by what physical resource that data is processed, transmitted and stored on becomes largely opaque from the perspective of an application or services’ ability to deliver it.  Infrastructure resources are generally pooled in order to deliver service regardless of the tenancy model employed – shared or dedicated.  This abstraction is generally provided by means of high levels of virtualization at the chipset and operating system levels or enabled at the higher levels by heavily customized filesystems, operating systems or communication protocols.
  2. Resource Democratization
    The abstraction of infrastructure yields the notion of resource democratization – whether infrastructure, applications, or information – and provides the capability for pooled resources to be made available and accessible to anyone or anything authorized to utilize them using standardized methods for doing so.
  3. Services Oriented Architecture
    As the abstraction of infrastructure from application and information yields well-defined and loosely-coupled resource democratization, the notion of utilizing these components in whole or part, alone or with integration, provides a services oriented architecture where resources may be accessed and utilized in a standard way.  In this model, the focus is on the delivery of service and not the management of infrastructure.
  4. Elasticity/Dynamism
    The on-demand model of Cloud provisioning coupled with high levels of automation, virtualization, and ubiquitous, reliable and high-speed connectivity provides for the capability to rapidly expand or contract resource allocation to service definition and requirements using a self-service model that scales to as-needed capacity.  Since resources are pooled, better utilization and service levels can be achieved.
  5. Utility Model Of Consumption & Allocation
    The abstracted, democratized, service-oriented and elastic nature of Cloud combined with tight automation, orchestration, provisioning and self-service then allows for dynamic allocation of resources based on any number of governing input parameters.  Given the visibility at an atomic level, the consumption of resources can then be used to provide an “all-you-can-eat” but “pay-by-the-bite” metered utility-cost and usage model. This facilitates greater cost efficiencies and scale as well as manageable and predictive costs.

Cloud Service Delivery Models

Three archetypal models and the derivative combinations thereof generally describe cloud service delivery.  The three individual models are often referred to as the “SPI Model,” where “SPI” refers to Software, Platform and Infrastructure (as a service) respectively and are defined thusly[1]:

  1. Software as a Service (SaaS)
    The capability provided to the consumer is to use the provider’s applications running on a cloud infrastructure and accessible from various client devices through a thin client interface such as a Web browser (e.g., web-based email). The consumer does not manage or control the underlying cloud infrastructure, network, servers, operating systems, storage, or even individual application capabilities, with the possible exception of limited user-specific application configuration settings.
  2. Platform as a Service (PaaS)
    The capability provided to the consumer is to deploy onto the cloud infrastructure consumer-created applications using programming languages and tools supported by the provider (e.g., java, python, .Net). The consumer does not manage or control the underlying cloud infrastructure, network, servers, operating systems, or storage, but the consumer has control over the deployed applications and possibly application hosting environment configurations.
  3. Infrastructure as a Service (IaaS)
    The capability provided to the consumer is to rent processing, storage, networks, and other fundamental computing resources where the consumer is able to deploy and run arbitrary software, which can include operating systems and applications. The consumer does not manage or control the underlying cloud infrastructure but has control over operating systems, storage, deployed applications, and possibly select networking components (e.g., firewalls, load balancers).

Understanding the relationship and dependencies between these models is critical.  IaaS is the foundation of all Cloud services with PaaS building upon IaaS, and SaaS – in turn – building upon PaaS.  We will cover this in more detail later in the document.

The OpenCrowd Cloud Solutions Taxonomy shown in Figure 1 provides an excellent reference that demonstrates the swelling ranks of solutions available today in each of the models above.

Narrowing the scope or specific capabilities and functionality within each of the *aaS offerings or employing the functional coupling of services and capabilities across them may yield derivative classifications.  For example “Storage as a Service” is a specific sub-offering with the IaaS “family,”  “Database as a Service” may be seen as a derivative of PaaS, etc.

Each of these models yields significant trade-offs in the areas of integrated features, openness (extensibility) and security.  We will address these later in the document.

Figure 1 - The OpenCrowd Cloud Taxonomy

Figure 1 - The OpenCrowd Cloud Taxonomy

Cloud Service Deployment and Consumption Modalities

Regardless of the delivery model utilized (SaaS, PaaS, IaaS,) there are four primary ways in which Cloud services are deployed and are characterized:

  1. Private
    Private Clouds are provided by an organization or their designated service provider and offer a single-tenant (dedicated) operating environment with all the benefits and functionality of elasticity and the accountability/utility model of Cloud.The physical infrastructure may be owned by and/or physically located in the organization’s datacenters (on-premise) or that of a designated service provider (off-premise) with an extension of management and security control planes controlled by the organization or designated service provider respectively.

    The consumers of the service are considered “trusted.”  Trusted consumers of service are those who are considered part of an organization’s legal/contractual
    umbrella including employees, contractors, & business partners.  Untrusted consumers are those that may be authorized to consume some/all services but are not logical extensions of the organization.

  2. Public
    Public Clouds are provided by a designated service provider and may offer either a single-tenant (dedicated) or multi-tenant (shared) operating environment with all the benefits and functionality of elasticity and the  accountability/utility model of Cloud.
    The physical infrastructure is generally owned by and managed by the designated service provider and located within the provider’s datacenters (off-premise.)  Consumers of Public Cloud services are considered to be untrusted.
  3. Managed
    Managed Clouds are provided by a designated service provider and may offer either a single-tenant (dedicated) or multi-tenant (shared) operating environment with all the benefits and functionality of elasticity and the  accountability/utility model of Cloud.The physical infrastructure is owned by and/or physically located in the organization’s datacenters with an extension of management and security control planes controlled by the designated service provider.  Consumers of Managed Clouds may be trusted or untrusted.

  4. Hybrid
    Hybrid Clouds are a combination of public and private cloud offerings that allow for transitive information exchange and possibly application compatibility and portability across disparate Cloud service offerings and providers utilizing standard or proprietary methodologies regardless of ownership or location.  This model provides for an extension of management and security control planes.  Consumers of Hybrid Clouds may be trusted or untrusted.

The difficulty in using a single label to describe an entire service/offering is that it actually attempts to describe the following elements:

  • Who manages it
  • Who owns it
  • Where it’s located
  • Who has access to it
  • How it’s accessed

The notion of Public, Private, Managed and Hybrid when describing Cloud services really denotes the attribution of management and the availability of service to specific consumers of the service.

It is important to note that often the characterizations that describe how Cloud services are deployed are often used interchangeably with the notion of where they are provided; as such, you may often see public and private clouds referred to as “external” or “internal” clouds.  This can be very confusing.

The manner in which Cloud services are offered and ultimately consumed is then often described relative to the location of the asset/resource/service owner’s management or security “perimeter” which is usually defined by the presence of a “firewall.”

While it is important to understand where within the context of an enforceable security boundary an asset lives, the problem with interchanging or substituting these definitions is that the notion of a well-demarcated perimeter separating the “outside” from the “inside” is an anachronistic concept.

It is clear that the impact of the re-perimeterization and the erosion of trust boundaries we have seen in the enterprise is amplified and accelerated due to Cloud.  This is thanks to ubiquitous connectivity provided to devices, the amorphous nature of information interchange, the ineffectiveness of traditional static security controls which cannot deal with the dynamic nature of Cloud services and the mobility and velocity at which Cloud services operate.

Thus the deployment and consumption modalities of Cloud should be thought of not only within the construct of “internal” or “external” as it relates to asset/resource/service physical location, but also by whom they are being consumed and who is responsible for their governance, security and compliance to policies and standards.

This is not to suggest that the on- or off-premise location of an asset/resource/information does not affect the security and risk posture of an organization, because it does, but it also depends upon the following:

  • The types of application/information/services being managed
  • Who manages them and how
  • How controls are integrated
  • Regulatory issues

Table 1 illustrates the summarization of these points:

Table 1 - Cloud Computing Service Deployment

Table 1 - Cloud Computing Service Deployment

As an example, one could classify a service as IaaS/Public/External (Amazon’s AWS/EC2 offering is a good example) as well as SaaS/Managed/Internal (an internally-hosted, but third party-managed custom SaaS stack using Eucalyptus, as an example.)

Thus when assessing the impact a particular Cloud service may have on one’s security posture and overall security architecture, it is necessary to classify the asset/resource/service within the context of not only its location but also its criticality and business impact as it relates to management and security.  This means that an appropriate level of risk assessment is performed prior to entrusting it to the vagaries of “The Cloud.”

Which Cloud service deployment and consumption model is used depends upon the nature of the service and the requirements that govern it.  As we demonstrate later in this document, there are significant trade-offs in each of the models in terms of integrated features, extensibility, cost, administrative involvement and security.

Figure 2 - Cloud Reference Model

Figure 2 - Cloud Reference Model

It is therefore important to be able to classify a Cloud service quickly and accurately and compare it to a reference model that is familiar to an IT networking or security professional.

Reference models such as that shown in Figure 2 allows one to visualize the boundaries of *aaS definitions, how and where a particular Cloud service fits, and also how the discrete *aaS models align and interact with one another.  This is presented in an OSI-like layered structure with which security and network professionals should be familiar.

Considering each of the *aaS models as a self-contained “solution stack” of integrated functionality with IaaS providing the foundation, it becomes clear that the other two models – PaaS and SaaS – in turn build upon it.

Each of the abstract layers in the reference model represents elements which when combined, comprise the services offerings in each class.

IaaS includes the entire infrastructure resource stack from the facilities to the hardware platforms that reside in them. Further, IaaS incorporates the capability to abstract resources (or not) as well as deliver physical and logical connectivity to those resources.  Ultimately, IaaS provides a set of API’s which allows for management and other forms of interaction with the infrastructure by the consumer of the service.

Amazon’s AWS Elastic Compute Cloud (EC2) is a good example of an IaaS offering.

PaaS sits atop IaaS and adds an additional layer of integration with application development frameworks, middleware capabilities and functions such as database, messaging, and queuing that allows developers to build applications which are coupled to the platform and whose programming languages and tools are supported by the stack.  Google’s AppEngine is a good example of PaaS.

SaaS in turn is built upon the underlying IaaS and PaaS stacks and provides a self-contained operating environment used to deliver the entire user experience including the content, how it is presented, the application(s) and management capabilities. is a good example of SaaS.

It should therefore be clear that there are significant trade-offs in each of the models in terms of features, openness (extensibility) and security.

Figure 3 - Trade-off’s Across *aaS Offerings

Figure 3 - Trade-off’s Across *aaS Offerings

Figure 3 demonstrates the interplay and trade-offs between the three *aaS models:

  • Generally, SaaS provides a large amount of integrated features built directly into the offering with the least amount of extensibility and a relatively high level of security.
  • PaaS generally offers less integrated features since it is designed to enable developers to build their own applications on top of the platform and is therefore more extensible than SaaS by nature, but due to this balance trades off on security features and capabilities.
  • IaaS provides few, if any, application-like features, provides for enormous extensibility but generally less security capabilities and functionality beyond protecting the infrastructure itself since it expects operating systems, applications and content to be managed and secured by the consumer.

The key takeaway from a security architecture perspective in comparing these models is that the lower down the stack the Cloud service provider stops, the more security capabilities and management the consumer is responsible for implementing and managing themselves.

This is critical because once a Cloud service can be classified and referenced against the model, mapping the security architecture, business and regulatory or other compliance requirements against it becomes a gap-analysis exercise to determine the general “security” posture of a service and how it relates to the assurance and protection requirements of an asset.

Figure 4 below shows an example of how mapping a Cloud service can be compared to a catalog of compensating controls to determine what existing controls exist and which do not as provided by either the consumer, the Cloud service provider or another third party.

Figure 4 - Mapping the Cloud Model to the Security Model
Figure 4 – Mapping the Cloud Model to the Security Model

Once this gap analysis is complete as governed by the requirements of any regulatory or other compliance mandates, it becomes much easier to determine what needs to be done in order to feed back into a risk assessment framework to determine how the gaps and ultimately how the risk should be addressed: accept, transfer, mitigate or ignore.


Understanding how architecture, technology, process and human capital requirements change or remain the same when deploying Cloud Computing services is critical.   Without a clear understanding of the higher-level architectural implications of Cloud services, it is impossible to address more detailed issues in a rational way.

The keys to understanding how Cloud architecture impacts security architecture are a common and concise lexicon coupled with a consistent taxonomy of offerings by which Cloud services and architecture can be deconstructed, mapped to a model of compensating security and operational controls, risk assessment and management frameworks and in turn, compliance standards.

[1] Credit: Peter M. Mell, NIST

I Wish I Were Six Again; Innovation Angst Didn’t Suck Then.

July 15th, 2009 14 comments

I want tell you a little secret.  I want to be the next Ron Popeil.  I don’t care to be the first, just the first to realize a vision regarding something I verbalize.  I think I actually have a reasonable track record to warrant my lofty aspirations:

*When I was six growing up on a sheep farm in New Zealand, I grabbed an air mail envelope, drew a picture accompanied by some text and sent it off addressed to some generic address at the Pentagon in the U.S.  The drawing was an idea I had for what is now called a Thrust Vectoring Nozzle on jet aircraft.  I also paired that with oil injection into the manifold to produce enormous amounts of black smoke  to enable evasive action.  I figured I’d go for a two-fer.

* When I was 17 I wrote a similar letter complete with diagrams to Shimano because I was so damned tired of the crappy braking system on my off-road bicycle and suggested a hub-centric disk brake system for bicycles.

* In 1996, after forming my first startup and angel funding, my father-in-law and I architected an ASIC-based firewall appliance that would run Check Point firewall-1 code (ported) to a platform that had no OS and provided extremely high levels of performance with offload NPU’s and high-speed memory for state-table synchronization in clusters.  We took it to Check Point. They laughed.  6 months later they did a deal with Ascom Timeplex…

* In 2001 I built a prototype of an, um, entertainment system that involved 3D goggles, VRML, a nintendo power glove and, er, adult entertainment via a network-based  pay-per-play service

* Oh, the hits just-a-kept-on-comin’…

Somewhere between then and now, despite helping raise millions in VC funding for other people’s ideas, I stopped verbalizing my own and that makes me sad.

Where and when I can, I’m going to verbalize some of the ideas buried in my brain.  I have hundreds of them.  One day I hope one of them make someone else say “HEY! I thought of that!”  I’m an idea guy.  I want a T-Shirt that says that.

You have anything you’ve “invented” that’s showed up sometime later?


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