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Should Vendors Mitigate All Vulnerabilities Immediately?

I read an interesting piece by Roger Grimes @ InfoWorld wherein he described the situation of a vendor who was not willing to patch an unsupported version of software even though it was vulnerable and shown to be (remotely) exploitable.

Rather, the vendor suggested that using some other means (such as blocking the offending access port) was the most appropriate course of action to mitigate the threat.

What’s interesting about the article is not that the vendor is refusing to patch older unsupported code, but that ultimately Roger suggests that irrespective of severity, vendors should immediately patch ANY exploitable vulnerability — with or without public disclosure.

A reader who obviously works for a software vendor commented back with a reply that got Roger thinking and it did for me, also.   The reader suggests that they don’t patch lower severity vulnerabilities immediately (they actually "sit on them" until a customer raises a concern) but instead focus on the higher-severity discoveries:

The reader wrote
to say that his company often sits on security bugs until they are
publicly announced or until at least one customer complaint is made.
Before you start disagreeing with this policy, hear out the rest of his

company spends significantly to root out security issues," says the
reader. "We train all our programmers in secure coding, and we follow
the basic tenets of secure programming design and management. When bugs
are reported, we fix them. Any significant security bug that is likely
to be high risk or widely used is also immediately fixed. But if we
internally find a low- or medium-risk security bug, we often sit on the
bug until it is reported publicly. We still research the bug and come
up with tentative solutions, but we don’t patch the problem.”

In the best of worlds, I’d agree with Roger — vendors should patch all vulnerabilities as quickly as possible once discovered, irrespective of whether or not the vulnerability or exploit is made public.  The world would be much better — assuming of course that the end-user could actually mitigate the vulnerability by applying the patch in the first place.

Let’s play devil’s advocate for a minute…

Back here on planet Earth, the prioritization of mitigating vulnerabilities and the resource allocation to mitigate the vulnerability is approached by vendors not unlike the way in which the consumers choose to apply patches of the same; most look at the severity of a vulnerability and start from the highest severity and make their way down.  That’s just the reality of my observation.   

So, for the bulk of these consumers, is the vendor’s response out of line?  It seems in total alignment.

As a counterpoint to my own discussion here, I’d suggest that using prudent risk management best practice, one would protect those assets that matter most.  Sometimes this means that one would mitigate a Sev3 (medium) vulnerability over a Sev5 (highest) based upon risk exposure…this is where solutions like Skybox come in to play.  Vendors can’t attach a weight to an asset, all they can do is assess the impact that an exploitable vulnerability might have on their product…

The reader’s last comment caps it off neatly with a challenge:

“Industry pundits such as yourself often say that
it benefits customers more when a company closes all known security
holes, but in my 25 years in the industry, I haven’t seen that to be
true. In fact I’ve seen the exact opposite. And before you reply, I
haven’t seen an official study that says otherwise. Until you can
provide me with a research paper, everything you say in reply is just
your opinion. With all this said, once the hole is publicly announced,
or becomes high-risk, we close it. And we close it fast because we
already knew about it, coded a solution, and tested it.”

I’m not sure I need an official study to respond to this point, but I’d be interested in if there were such a thing.  Gerhard Eschelbeck has been studying vulnerabilities and their half-lives for some time.  I’d be interested to see how this plays.

So, read the gentleman’s posts; in some cases his comments are understandable and in others they’re hard to swallow…this definitely depends upon which (if not both) side of the fence you stand.  All vendors are ultimately consumers in one form or another…



  1. May 19th, 2007 at 03:38 | #1

    I would only agree partially with what the software developer has said … He is right when he says that a fix may not be rolled out immediately when a security bug is detected internally – All the same, I do not think (my opinion admittedly) any vendor just "sits on the bug".
    Most vendors have cycles of development and releases and the bug fix is usually lined up for the next release date. So, unless a customer faces a problem first or unless there is some major external event to pre-pone the release the bug would be fixed in due time.
    Ofcourse my experience with software development is just @4 years which is much smaller than his 20 years and again all the above is my understanding and opinion.
    Best Regards

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