CloudPassage & Why Guest-Based Footprints Matter Even More For Cloud Security
Every day for the last week or so after their launch, I’ve been asked left and right about whether I’d spoken to CloudPassage and what my opinion was of their offering. In full disclosure, I spoke with them when they were in stealth almost a year ago and offered some guidance as well as the day before their launch last week.
Disappointing as it may be to some, this post isn’t really about my opinion of CloudPassage directly; it is, however, the reaffirmation of the deployment & delivery models for the security solution that CloudPassage has employed. I’ll let you connect the dots…
Specifically, in public IaaS clouds where homogeneity of packaging, standardization of images and uniformity of configuration enables scale, security has lagged. This is mostly due to the fact that for a variety of reasons, security itself does not scale (well.)
In an environment where the underlying platform cannot be counted upon to provide “hooks” to integrate security capabilities in at the “network” level, all that’s left is what lies inside the VM packaging:
- Harden and protect the operating system [and thus the stuff atop it,]
- Write secure applications and
- Enforce strict, policy-driven information-centric security.
My last presentation, “Cloudinomicon: Idempotent Infrastructure, Building Survivable Systems and Bringing Sexy Back to Information Centricity” addressed these very points. [This one is a version I delivered at the University of Michigan Security Summit]
If we focus on the first item in that list, you’ll notice that generally to effect policy in the guest, you must have a footprint on said guest — however thin — to provide the hooks that are needed to either directly effect policy or redirect back to some engine that offloads this functionality. There’s a bit of marketing fluff associated with using the word “agentless” in many applications of this methodology today, but at some point, the endpoint needs some sort of “agent” to play*
So that’s where we are today. The abstraction offered by virtualized public IaaS cloud platforms is pushing us back to the guest-centric-based models of yesteryear.
This will bring challenges with scale, management, efficacy, policy convergence between physical and virtual and the overall API-driven telemetry driven by true cloud solutions.
You can read more about this in some of my other posts on the topic:
- Incomplete Thought: Cloud Security IS Host-Based…At The Moment
- The Security Hamster Sine Wave Of Pain: Public Cloud & The Return To Host-Based Protection…
- Where Are the Network Virtual Appliances? Hobbled By the Virtual Network, That’s Where…
- Dear Public Cloud Providers: Please Make Your Networking Capabilities Suck Less. Kthxbye
Finally, since I used them for eyeballs, please do take a look at CloudPassage — their first (free) offerings are based upon leveraging small footprint Linux agents and a cloud-based SaaS “grid” to provide vulnerability management, and firewall/zoning in public cloud environments.
* There are exceptions to this rule depending upon *what* you’re trying to do, such as anti-malware offload via a hypervisor API, but this is not generally available to date in public cloud. This will, I hope, one day soon change.
- Revisiting Virtualization & Cloud Stack Security – Back to the Future (Baked In Or Bolted On?) (rationalsurvivability.com)
- From the Concrete To The Hypervisor: Compliance and IaaS/PaaS Cloud – A Shared Responsibility (rationalsurvivability.com)
- CloudPassage Halo-SVM and Fireware target cloud security (zdnet.com)
- Incomplete Thought: Why Security Doesn’t Scale…Yet. (rationalsurvivability.com)
- What’s The Problem With Cloud Security? There’s Too Much Of It… (rationalsurvivability.com)