100% Undetectable Malware (?)
I know I’m checking in late on this story, but for some reason, it just escaped my radar a month or so ago when it appeared…I think that within the context of some of the virtualization discussions in the security realm that it was interesting enough to visit.
Joanna Rutkowska, a security researcher for Singapore-based IT security firm COSEINC, posts on her Invisible Things blog some amazingly ingenious and frightening glimpses into the possibilities and security implications in terms of malware offered up by the virtualization technologies in AMD’s SVM (Secure Virtual machine)/Pacifica technology.*
Joanna’s really talking about exploiting the virtualization capabilities of technology like Pacifica to apply stealth by moving the entire operating system into the virtualization layer (in memory — AKA "the matrix.") If the malware itself controls the virtualization layer, then the "reality" of what is "good" versus "bad" (and detectable as such) is governed within the context of the malware itself. You can’t detect "bad" via security mechanisms because it’s simply not an available option for the security mechanisms to do so. Ouch.
This is not quite the same concept that we’ve seen thus far in more "traditional" (?) VM rootkits which load VMM’s below the OS level by exploiting a known vulnerability first. With Blue Pill, you don’t *need* a vulnerability to exploit. You should check out this story for more information on this topic such as SubVirt as described on eWeek.
Here is an excerpt from Joanna’s postings thus far:
"Now, imagine a malware (e.g. a network backdoor, keylogger, etc…)
whose capabilities to remain undetectable do not rely on obscurity of
the concept. Malware, which could not be detected even though its
algorithm (concept) is publicly known. Let’s go further and imagine
that even its code could be made public, but still there would be no
way for detecting that this creature is running on our machines…"
"The idea behind Blue Pill is simple: your operating system swallows the
Blue Pill and it awakes inside the Matrix controlled by the ultra thin
Blue Pill hypervisor. This all happens on-the-fly (i.e. without
restarting the system) and there is no performance penalty and all the
devices, like graphics card, are fully accessible to the operating
system, which is now executing inside virtual machine. This is all
possible thanks to the latest virtualization technology from AMD called
This story (once I started researching) was originally commented on by Bill Brenner from techtarget, but I had not seen it until now. Bill does an excellent job in laying out some of the more relevant points including highlighting the comparisons to the subvirt rootkit as well as some counterpoints aruged from the other side. That last hyperlink to Kurt Wismer’s blog is just as interesting. I love the last statement he makes:
"if undetectable virtualization technology can be used to hide the
presence of malware, then equally undetectable virtualization
technology pre-emptively deployed on the system should be able to
detect the undetectable vm-based stealth malware if/when it is encountered…
Alas, I was booked to attend Black Hat in August but my priorities have
been re-clocked, so unfortunately I will not be able to attend Joanna’s
presentation where she is demonstrating her functional prototype of Blue Pill.
I’ve submitted that the notion of virtualization is one of the reasons that embedding more and more security as an embedded function within the "network" as a single pane of glass into the total situational awareness from a security perspective is a flawed proposition as more and more of the "network" will become virtualized within the VM constructs themselves.
I met with some of Microsoft’s security architects on this very topic and we stared intently at one another hoping for suggestions that would allow us to plan today for what will surely become a more frightening tomorrow.
I’m going to post about this shortly.
Happy reading. There’s not much light in the rabbit hole, however.
*Here’s a comparison of the Intel/AMD approach to virtualization, including SVM.